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PART X CONCLUSION

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATION-STATE: DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

Being a centralist feudal empire, the Ottoman Empire had features that resist any structural changes. Because of this, it was hindering social and economical development. However, since it is impossible to maintain the same hindrance forever, the Ottoman order started to be disassembled after the 16th century.

The reforming process into which the Ottoman society had entered was not really a healthy social and economical evolution, but rather was a putrefaction. The state was always engaged in preventing the formation of strong social and economical groups. This was because the ranking structure of Ottomans was formed not according to social and economical criteria, but rather according to political factors (Mardin, 1969:95-106). In other words, the ranking order of Ottomans was the outcome of political structure, but not social and economical structure.

There were three main political classes. The first of these were the administrators who composed of the Caliph-Sultan and his both military and civilian bureaucrats. The second class were those who were governed. This class comprised the agriculturist population in rural areas and traders and craftsmen in the urban areas (some of these people later joined the intermediate classes). Thirdly we see intermediate classes. These were made up of local leaders who were called "ashraf (notables (tradesmen-small landowners))" and "ayan (landowners). These "intermediate classes" gained strength by the subversion of the land regime and bureaucracy. Since they could not take full control of the agricultural products and the farming population, they were only able to play a role of "mediator" between the administrating class and the exploited husbandmen. Although some of them used to be engaged in the production of some commercial and manufactured goods, they still could not accumulate a significant capital.

On the other hand, in a bureaucratic formation which had an ideological integrity, the centralist power holders had become a separate class "within themselves" and "for themselves". A significant part of these centralist powers will have joined to the "intermediate classes" and will have formed the main social and economical power behind the War of Independence and Revolutions that were initiated by Ataturk.

COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Meanwhile, thanks to their successful attempts and revolutions of intellectualism and industrialisation, Western societies were progressing quickly and steadily in the process of capitalisation.

However, Ottoman society in which the pressures for reformation and the restrictive dominance of the state conflicted, started to be insufficient in meeting the continually increasing financial and military needs of the Empire. The main cause lying behind this stalemate was staying away from technological progress. When light firearms entered into the Ottoman army towards the end of the 15th century, infantrymen had become the basis of the military structure. As a result of this, the cavalymen (sipahis (sultanate knights) and their men) has started to loose their effective positions in the structure. This change naturally decreased the importance and functionality of land order that supplied horsemen to the army. Hence, the Ottoman system which was based on land order began to break apart (Karpas, 1973b: 33-34). The economic progression of the West provided the Western countries a military superiority. Thus, the Ottoman Empire gradually came under the dominion of the West. The collapse of the empire was accelerated when the economical, financial and military control was added to the nationalistic trends that were spreading among various ethnic groups within the empire.

The quick emergence of a capitalist class who were dependent upon foreign economies overpowered and killed off the newly arising efforts of local manufacturing. It was impossible for domestic manufacturers to compete with European economy. Because the techniques they used were outdated and the capital they have accumulated was very deficient. What is more, the capitulation, that is the legal, economical and financial privileges that were granted to Westerners, were making this competition even more impossible.

EMERGENCE OF THE "ETATIST-ELITISTS": MODEL OF NATION STATE

After these events, not the governed class, but the governing class started to differentiate among themselves, quite the opposite situation to what happened in the West. Military and civilian bureaucracy appeared as a strong opposition group against the Caliph-Sultan. However, the struggle between the bureaucrats and the Caliph-Sultan was not supported by the public. Because behind this movement, there were no social or economical concerns that were related to the benefit of the public. The principal characteristic of this effort exerted by bureaucrats who were ideologically conditioned against the Sultan, was only to put into practice their thoughts about establishing a constitution which was merely adopted from the West and in reality nothing to do with the Ottoman society (Soysal, 1974:22-24; 27-28). Previous-slaves of the Sultan were playing a role as saviors of the Empire under the effect of their adopted ideologies. This transformation caused some "etatist-elitist" groups who used the power of the state for reformations, to appear on the scene. The emergence of "etatist-elitists" dialectically created "traditional-liberal" reactions against efforts of Westernisation. Claiming to be the representatives of Ottoman Tradition, these reactions were, quite naturally, based on religion.

"Etatist-elitist" groups managed to take the control of the Empire through the "Ittihad ve Terakki" (Party of Union and Progress). Since these two groups were supporters of the West, parallel to the economical development of the West, they wanted to encourage the formation a national bourgeois. However, soon after the "Ittihad ve Terakki" came into power, the First World War broke out. Thus, there was no time left to plan and guide the social and economical endeavors that were necessary for the formation of a national bourgeois.

Ataturk's Revolution (the War of Independence and the Revolutions) that attempted to change the old political system, also followed pattern of Westernisation. Determined to establish a contemporary nation-state and to eradicate the Sultanate, Mustafa Kemal (Erikan, 1971:10-11)

also envisioned creating a national capitalist class in order to promote nation-wide economical progress. Anti-imperialist course of action of the War of Independence greatly facilitated Ataturk's establishment of the national economy away from Western dominion. On the other hand, thanks to the union that was constituted between the "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats and the "intermediate classes", a national bourgeois was formed and at the same time the classes and groups to be supported were determined.

Therefore, the style of Ottoman-Turkish development and reformation had been put into practice, aiming to catch up with the Western model, though as a completely opposite process to that experienced in the West. The concept of "nationalist-state" and principles like the nationalism, secularity, republicanism and populism which were all outcomes of the capitalisation process that became definite at the end of the Intellectual and industrial revolutions, have all been brought into existence by persistent orders from higher ranks.

In other words, the social and economical institutions that appeared gradually in the West, as a natural result of economic development, were expected to erupt suddenly and generate the economical growth and reformations in newly established Turkey, following decisions taken without the support of gradual maturation and public consent.

Thus, the "intellectualism and industrialism train" that had been missed by the Ottomans was trying to be caught via a "short-cut" by the new "nationalist-state".

EFFORTS TOWARDS CREATING A NATIONAL BOURGEOIS

In 1922, some bureaucrats and "bourgeois" members who were trading and owned small factories (ayan, ashraf), had already established foreign trading companies in order to constitute the seed of an independent national economy which would endure against imperialism (Ilkin, 1971: 221; 229-231). Mustafa Kemal Ataturk applied a revolutionist approach to political and cultural heritage, whereas he enforced an evolutionist approach upon social and economic resources. In other words, political and cultural structures were altered by force, but the social and economical structure of the day was compulsorily accepted as the origin of the national economy.

To be able to form a national economy, the method that was followed was to first save the country from foreign domination and to provide government support for the capitalist class.

Under the social, economical and ideological conditions of the day, the only solution that could be found at the time was to render a union between the political bureaucrats, and "ashraf" and "ayan". Hence, a reconciliation was contrived between the "etatist-elitist" groups and the local leaders. Massive numbers of ordinary people were again left out of this unification (Ozek, 1968: 148-150).

Being the savior of the nation, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had actually formed significant reconciliation between diverse classes and groups. For example, before and after the experiment of the "Terakkiperver Firka" (Republican Progressive Party), both the "etatist-elitist" groups and "traditional-liberals" had lived side by side under his leadership. On the other hand, all fundamentalist-fanatic religious groups who were existing in the "traditional-liberal" side, were suppressed. As for the socialists, in the first years of the revolution, they were among the supporters of Ataturk (Cavdar, 1974:157-158). Thus, the absolute leadership of Ataturk had become a symbol of national unity.

Having achieved the establishment of an economical and political reconciliation together with the

central power, "the intermediate classes" were extremely pleased with the situation. As this cooperation between the "intermediate classes" and the bureaucrat politicians (there were no differences between bureaucrats and politicians in those days) started to progress towards forming a capital owning class, the differentiation between the "etatist-elitists" and the "traditional-liberals" began to come to the surface even during Ataturk's rule.

While the "etatist-elitists" groups were asserting that the economical system should be wholly controlled by the state, the "traditional-liberals" were claiming that the state (government) should only *support* the private sector rather than interfere. The previously defined main course of the social and economical changes to be carried out in the country were in favor of the "traditional-liberals". Because of this, the "etatist-elitist" thoughts which were represented by Ismet Inonu have been letdown. Truly, when the core of the capital owning class was formed, instead of Ismet Inonu, the position of Prime Minister was given to Celal Bayar who himself was known as being close to the "traditional-liberal" approach. This differentiation was also revealing the differences of opinion between Ataturk and Ismet Inonu regarding the economical problems (Selek 1975). For Celal Bayar to be the leader of Democrat Party action later in 1946 is not at all coincidental, because Celal Bayar was the defender of "traditional-liberal" thought in bureaucracy since the Ataturk era.

The core group of capitalist class grew even faster after the death of Ataturk. Although Ismet Inonu had been the President after Ataturk died, since the social and economical structure was already firmly established as being based upon private enterprise, there were no more possibilities left to carry out significant changes. Thus, apart from drawing in government support, using all types of legal or illegal sources in order to increase the accumulation of assets, the bourgeois developed more rapidly during the Second World War.

Apart from other factors, the establishment of the Democrat Party was also a result of a bourgeois society that was fully matured. Rich landlords, traders and businessmen were strong supporters of this party. Since the Democrat Party was established as opposition to the centralist Republican People's Party, the "etatist-elitist" groups were dispelled by the "traditional-liberals" who gathered from all around the country (Mardin, 1973). Being fed up with the government of a single party, the public also sincerely supported the Democrat Party.

The Democrat Party accelerated the capitalist growth and development of the society in four ways: *Firstly*, people in rural areas gained a certain amount of capital by mechanization of farming. *Secondly*, all activities of the government were diverted towards supporting private enterprises. Cooperation between bureaucrats, politicians and capitalist class has been used effectively especially in the distribution of scarce goods like cement and iron, loan facilities and state awards for contracts. *Thirdly*, the development was financed by "inflationism", hence the national income was unjustly distributed. As a result of this, capital was hoarded by certain holders. Lastly, encouraging foreign investors to enter the country and using mostly foreign loans, a unification ground was based for the growing national bourgeois and the Western capitalism. Since the group called "the national bourgeois" had already grown through representatives of foreign companies and in forms of exporting-importing companies, this unification was completed in a very short time. Thus, the foreign dependence of the Turkish economy increased in parallel to the growth of the great capitalist class.

After the Democrat Party's rule was terminated by a coup, all the trends earlier explained, continued some of their actions in the mentality of "mixed economy". Capitalist formation has also increasingly developed during the "planned period". Because objective conditions that facilitate the economy to grow quickly in this way were prepared by the 1960 coup (Rozaliyev, 1970: 95-119). After the 1960 coup, the structure of capitalism was guided towards the principal of "social

welfare providing state". This meant these capitalist class would be forced to share their profits with the other ranks of society like workers and civil servants. Since this sort of sharing is the only way to maintain their existence within the society, the richest part of the capitalist rank straight-away adapted themselves to the conditions required by the "social welfare state". If it would continue otherwise, the uncontrolled capitalist exploitation might have caused some social and political rows to break out. Actually, the 1960 coup itself somehow served in the preparation of the environment suitable for the principles of "social welfare state" since it broke out as a reaction to the uncontrolled growth of capitalism.

However, during the period following 1960, society was still not democratically mature as those model nations of Western countries. The rights and freedom granted by the 1961 Constitution have not been able to be used effectively by minor radical groups and were eroded by the negative propaganda of majority supported-political parties claiming that "this country cannot be ruled with this constitution".

Actually democracy itself was being eroded by all these arguments.

All of these events led the country first to the 12th March 1971 coup and then the 12th September 1980 coup, where the military bureaucracy erased the contemporary institutions and made constitutional changes that hinder basic human rights and freedom.

The 12th September coup has also catered a special support to political Islam and caused an increase in religion-political activities which were carrying on both in the country and abroad.

The Ozal period was a term when the principle of "boundless exploitation" was combined with a religion-concerned policy and Turkey's capitalisation process was restructured in a way that brought to mind the periods once exploitation in the country had gone wild.

During this period of time, an open cooperation of the domestic economy with foreign economies in the international area was established and at the same time, within the country's borders, very close relations and allegiance between the bureaucracy and the bourgeois had been established especially in terms of "bribery and corruption".

Therefore, two conflicting consequences began to dominate the society that was about to enter the 21st century:

On one hand, in spite of the expectations of their support to democracy, the capitalist class have continued to increase their accumulation of wealth, and on the other hand, with the support that political Islamists gained, fundamentalist tendencies of desire to establish an Islamic order instead of the democratic regime have increased.

When signs of a regime-crisis appeared, military forces were put into the role of intervention with the government, which was afterwards called a "modern peaceful coup". As a conclusion however, a governmental change was imposed through which no other significant structural advancement was achieved in the country, apart from the compelling of uninterrupted eight years of compulsory education.

In this connection, the way of politics that was in coordination with city life's briber and looter bureaucrats on the lower level and with Mafia on the high level who were the members of a sacking culture which emerges illegally "out of street laws", was not clogged up only in forming the capital accumulation conforming to its rules, but it was also blocked up in general ruling of the country.

That was why the capitalisation process in Turkey has accelerated not with an understanding of "social welfare", but around the concept of "wild capitalism" similar to that in the 19th century.

Becoming a dominant concept of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, "globalisation" has been one of the important external agents of that formation. However, the country was not stable enough to carry the burden that is brought by this type of system, which is based upon the poverty of vast number of people and illegal looting. Certainly the capitalist class who realised this fact, adopted a position which depicts a positive manner for concepts of both secular-democracy, civil order and the social welfare state.

Labor organisations, the way of whose was impeded by the constitutional and legal restrictions, gradually started to overcome these obstacles and thanks to the lessons they learned earlier, they started to try to take part in the formation of the 21st century's Turkey.

It can easily be stated that the most important alliance of 21st century's Turkey will be among the capitalist class within democracy, and there will be a common platform where different groups of capitalist class and laborers will be able to discuss freely "democracy by representation", a concept defending that democracy is not a regime where robbers are directly supported.

2. DEVELOPMENTS IN AGRICULTURE

Capitalist progress in agriculture first caused the ownership of land to pass to large companies. In 1912, for example, enterprises that owned between 3-12 acres of land held the majority of 40%, whereas by the 1970s this had decreased to 27 % (DIE, 1973a:83). The realities behind the capitalisation of agriculture can be explained as follows: The number of tractors had increased by 100% between 1940 and 1995. The proportion of land worked with tractors also significantly increased. The ratio of lands worked with tractors to the total cultivable land has increased 40 times by the 1970s. The use of artificial fertilisers increased 4 fold between 1965 and 1972. The proportion of fertilised land increased by five and the ratio of fertilised land to the entire area of cultivable land increased by six. On the other hand, loans for agricultural activities increased four times between 1965 and 1972 (DIE, 1974: 188-189; 201), and six or seven times between 1975 and 1982 (DIE, 1983: 234). The total amount of loans provided for agriculture in 1995 reached a figure of 500 trillion Liras. In order to encourage capitalist growth, these loans were granted to large agricultural enterprises. In 1968, enterprises that constituted 30% of all agricultural organisations were enjoying 82 % of all loans that were dedicated to agriculture (Koksal, 1971). Whereas in Eastern Anatolia, big agricultural enterprises which constituted only 2.4 % of all agricultural organisations were keeping nearly all of the agricultural loans under their control (Besikci, 1970:486).

The developments we briefly mentioned above induced great impacts in the social and economic structure of the country. Yesterday's "ayan" and "ashraf" who constituted the "intermediate classes" have become today's influential landlords and agricultural managers. Not only did they attain great political power but they also started to transfer capital from agriculture towards sections of trade, banking and industry.

This sort of development may actually have been a result of industrialisation policies that were accelerated especially after the 1930s. Those who established the new nation-state, while trying to provide capital accumulation, planned this to be accomplished by a state-controlled and supported private sector on one hand, while on the other, they determined the main path of resource transfer

from agriculture towards industry.

In the 1930s, under the effect of that times world events in those days, the agricultural sector also had to compensate for high costs, agricultural production had decreased considerably and at the same time, a centralism trend in favor of big farms appeared more clearly in the property-owning structure.

Pamuk states that this formation was overturned in the second half of the 1930s and the real reformation (towards poverty) was disclosed as the result of policies followed during the Second World War (Pamuk, 1988).

Certainly, after the Second World War, when a multipartite period had started, the price of this change had to be paid by the Republican People's Party, despite of all of its struggles to solve the problems (Pamuk, 1988:108).

It is a phenomenon well known to many commentators that reformations and developments in agriculture significantly affected political life in Turkey. During the multipartite period when the "one man, one vote" principle was obeyed, it would be quite natural for the regime to be affected by the agricultural sector, since during the 1950s, the majority of the population were engaged in farming.

Toprak explains how agriculture contributed to the accumulation of capital during the translation from an empire to a nation-state as follows:

"Experiencing the structural reformation period from the end of the 19th century onwards, the Turkish agricultural sector had to overcome the political and economical crisis that has broken out both in the world and in Turkey.

"In the first half of the 20th century, the world endured the bitter experience of two World Wars and somehow managed to come out of these crises. Turkey herself was engaged in war for ten years. The country had to face many fundamental political changes: First a constitutional monarchy, then the Republic was established. Due to the loss of land, the population decreased as well as the scale of the domestic market. The surviving population was continuously mobilized both militarily and geographically. While on one hand, human resources were being exhausted; on the other hand, the human-land relationship was destroyed.

"In the second quarter of this century, by the establishment of the nation-state, a kind of stability was again achieved. In 25 years, the difficulty of supplying manpower has been overcome. The "Mobilization campaign" was brought to an end and balance between human and nature was re-established.

"Again in the second quarter of the century, although in a period of crisis during the Second World War, a homogeneous structure was given to the shrunken domestic market. By following a mercantilist policy, domestic monetary balances were re-established.

"The precarious period in the first quarter of the century ended thanks to positive repercussions that occurred in the world conjuncture after the Second World War, and the world's economy was delivered from instability and reached safety. Turkish economy (and agriculture) had also obtained its share from this new order and accumulation of half a century reflected upon the statistical data." (Toprak, 1988:34-35)

Thus, the capitalisation period in agriculture reached an amount of accretion that could also contribute to the industrialisation of the country.

RESULTS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE

In line with the approach of the "social state", the capitalist transformation of agriculture was initiated and developed with the support of the state (Tekeli, İlkin 1988; Erturk, Recep, 1997:69-75). These developments yielded at least five important results for the Turkish social and economical structure. The first result was the unification of the "intermediate classes" coming from an Ottoman background and high level bureaucrats and their seizure of rule of the country. This situation prevented great changes occurring in the agricultural sector. As a result of old, but now stronger, dominant powers participating more effectively in the country's rule, the agricultural sector underwent a very slow advance quite suited to Ottoman tradition. For example, despite being a reform that was emphasized mostly by members of etatist-elitist groups, the land reform has never been put into practice (Ozgur, 1972: 166-168). The tedious development of agriculture was also contrary to Ataturk's fast political and cultural revolutions. *Certainly, this sluggish process of change of the agricultural sector is one of the main reasons for the public not taking in so easily the political and cultural revolutions of the new Republic.*

Since in rural areas the old social and economical structure was still preserved, revolutionary changes through education in these areas failed. During the 1940s, "village institutes" which were established to change the traditional balance of power in villages and to introduce to them more modern and technological farm implements were unsuccessful for the same reason. At the time as the "village institutes" program was put into practice, the distribution of power in typical rural areas was arranged following the same principles of centuries ago. It was this old structure that swallowed the efforts of village institutions (Tonguc, 1970:35). Again, for the same reason, "social development" endeavors that were implemented after the 1960 coup have been unsuccessful (Geray, 1967: 200-203).

The second result of the capitalisation of the agricultural sector was the impoverishment of masses of people that lived in rural areas (Geray, 1974:48-54). Mechanisation and accumulation of land under the possession of large-scale enterprises has, to a certain degree, caused the stale feudal order to tremble. Because of this - although it was limited - the social and economical security provided by the old order has also been destroyed (Bozarslan, 1966:15-18). Thus, a freelance workforce has emerged in the agricultural sector and a migration from rural areas towards urban areas has begun. These two events are the main determining factors of our country's present social and economical structure.

The third result was the provision of a certain amount of capital that has been accumulated following agricultural activities. This capital has been afterwards used for trading, banking and industry. Hence, although the transfer of resources was insufficient, this still contributed to the industrialisation of the country.

The fourth result is the blending of some villages into the market economy after they were rescued from their previous closed economy. This unification has brought modernity to the social lives of many villages (Tutengil, 1969:15-17; Balaman, 1969:287). Naturally, modern life-styles enabled the villagers to gain a more developed political conscience. Thus, capitalist developments in agriculture have prepared a wide medium for the participation in politics of people living in rural areas (Ozankaya, 1971:228-229)..

As the fifth result, the notion of landlordship, which was determined by the semi-feudal relationships among the agricultural sector, has been almost eradicated in the 21st century.

Economic developments experienced in the years following 1980 reveal that Turkey's agricultural sector in the 21st century has attained a similar structure to those of industrialised countries.

In this context, a very significant turning point is Turkey's entry into the European Customs Union. Importantly, the abrogation of customs barriers for agricultural products is likely to cause great problems in the agricultural life of Turkey. It looks as if this practice, which began in 1998, will deeply affect both Turkey's economy and its agriculture.

3.DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRY

The weak and foreign-dependent economy of the Ottomans has tended to be strengthened by the newly-established Republican state for the past fifty years. The number of industrial enterprises has increased by 690 times, from 264 in 1915, to 160,772 in 1968 (Turkish Ministry of Industry and Technology, 1973:437). On the other hand, the number of investments increased 15-folds in fixed prices and more than 60-folds in market prices between 1948 and 1973. Only 12 % of all investments were directed towards agriculture in 1973 and 1974, whereas manufacturing industry has utilised 32 % of these. The rate of total industrial investments has reached 42 % compared with all other investments. Between 1979 and 1983, a quarter of all fixed capital investment was committed to manufacturing industry; 45 % of these investments were introduced by private enterprises (DPT, 1984:19).

On the other hand, the decreasing rate of agriculture and increasing rate of industry within the "Gross National Product" equalized at the beginning of 1980 and then industry regained an advantage over agriculture. In 1995, the share of agriculture in the GNP has been reduced to 14.4 % whilst that of industry has reached 27,7 % (DIE, 1997:613).

COMPANIONATION AS A CRITERION FOR CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

In parallel with capitalist advancements, the number of newly established companies is also increasing each year. The number of newly-established companies was 1,950 in 1965, reaching 5,055 in 1972. Newly-established joint-stock companies numbered only 84 in 1965. However, their number increased to 347 in 1972. Whilst the total of all joint-stock companies comprised only 6.8 % of newly-established companies, their working capital reached a very high rate of 72.1 % among the total capital of all recently established companies. In 1972, 96.3 % of all capital growth was yielded by joint-stock companies. As to the net amount of capital growth, joint-stock companies held 88.2 % of the total amount of 5.6 billion TL (DIE, 1974:350). The number of newly-established companies was 2,746 in 1982 and the rate of joint-stock companies among all recently established companies was 41.7 %. The total amount of capital in these joint-stock companies had reached a rate of 83.6 % of the total capital value of newly established companies. 1,109 of the 1,350 companies that achieved capital growth were joint-stock companies, the rate being 82.1 %, with an amount of 1.871 billion TL, (95 % of all capital growth) belonging to joint-stock companies (DIE, 1983:346). As can be seen, the "growth" in this year is quite remarkable. The joint-stock companies are mostly established in Istanbul, the central city for the development of capitalism in Turkey. Although they are called capital companies, it is a known phenomenon

that most of these joint-stock companies are owned and run by members of one family (Ansay, 1971:109, 134-135).

More than 56 thousand companies with a total capital amount of more than 75 trillion TL were established in 1995 and 6.6 % of them were joint-stock companies. However, joint-stock companies owned 48 % of all capital owned by newly established companies. Up until 1990, the joint-stock companies had always held most of the total capital, whereas after that date the number of limited companies and their rating amount the newly established companies increased by a significant amount.

THE ORGANISATION OF CAPITALIST CLASSES

In Turkey, the capitalist class has been organised as "chambers" since it was first appeared. This type of organisation was supported by the government that made the necessary laws and granted these "chambers" a certain authority. Since the "chambers" had been provided with powers like the allotment of foreign currency and quotas, they became very influential in quite a short time. In the end, chambers of commerce, associations of manufacturers, and stock exchanges unified under one organisation. Apart from the group called Odalar Birligi (The Chambers Union), the capitalist class also established the "Confederation of Employers (Leaders) Unions". This was a separate organisation representing the powers of the bourgeoisie against the confederations of labor unions. This organisation was protecting the political and economical benefits of the capitalist classes. At the same time, it provided beneficial contributions to its members by triggering the introduction of commercial and business law (Esin, 1974:177-210;246-263).

The most significant organisational progress for the capitalist class emerged in August 1971, following the 12th March Warning sent to the government by the army. During this time, a group of big manufacturers and businessmen then established the "Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSIAD)" in Istanbul. This association declared; "the aim of our Association is to help Turkey to achieve a democratic and planned development conforming the rules of mixed economy and principles of Ataturk, as also determined in our Constitution, and to assist our nation to reach level of Western civilisation. In order to achieve this target, the Association regards industry as a driving force for development and it encourages all industrialists, professionals, scientists and businessmen, including the public sector in Turkey, to unite within the Association for the purpose of protecting and reinforcing the democratic state of law and free enterprise, urging the latter to progress and to create an organizational structure which is beneficial to the country's interests..." (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen, no date).

The establishment of this association was the indicator of the differentiation between the big bourgeoisie and the capitalist class from other sections of the society in Turkey. The aim of the association also reveals that the big bourgeoisie announced themselves as the protector and developer of "free enterprise" and "the democratic state of the law". According to their definition, "the democratic state of law" is the complementary part of "free enterprise". Thus, "the mixed economy" is regarded as an assurance for the continual existence of "free enterprise" under constitutional security. Surely, this kind of approach is very similar to that of Western capitalism which progressed under the concept of "state of law". This attitude lead to three different results which are peculiar to Turkey.

GENERAL LINES OF BIG CAPITALIST (DEVELOPED BOURGEOISIE) APPROACH

Stating their aims as above, the big bourgeoisie had to accept the limitation of their previously uncontrolled exploitation over labor power and trading. In other words, as the rights of employees comprise an inseparable part of Turkish democracy, the capitalist class or at least the big bourgeoisie seem to acknowledge these rights to be valid. No doubt acceptance of these rights means also accepting the limitation of the uncontrolled capitalist exploitation. This is a quite smart approach for the big bourgeoisie because a strong working class has become a real part of the Turkish society as a result of capitalist movements in Turkey. Moreover, the developed bourgeoisie had more resources to pay higher salaries for the workers. Naturally, it is debatable as to whether this well-developed bourgeoisie is reflecting their real intentions or not.

The second point that can be extracted from the declaration is the protective manner which is exhibited by the bourgeoisie over today's social, economical and political order. This attitude can be understood, because the structure of the "mixed economy" facilitates economic development via private enterprise. What is more, since the concept of "Democratic State of Law" determines a certain stage in the Turkish political and economical development, even though temporarily, the big bourgeoisie is depicting a very "contemporary" scene. However, this contemporariness is short-lasting and can mean something only when it is compared with other capital sectors. Their role is "temporary" because the social, economic and political development of Turkey will not endure to the stage of being a "State of Law". Perception of "State of Law" first changed with the perception of the "Social Welfare State". However, with the 1980 coup and in the following period of Ozal, this approach was largely lost.

After the 1991 elections, "the Social Welfare State" had been brought back as a political statement, however, its applications did not match the statement. The big capitalist class have been apathetic about democratic rights and freedoms and were well aligned with the Ozal period. The developed bourgeoisie will probably also adopt a "conservative" attitude in the future.

The third point that the declaration brought up is that the big capitalist class in Turkey are extremely rank-conscious. They differentiated themselves from the small manufacturers and small traders. Moreover, they established an organisation which will protect the interests of the big bourgeoisie and they are now ready to fight. This shows that they spent and will spend great efforts to protect their relations with Western capitalism and to control the distribution of resources such as capital, loans, raw materials and foreign currency.

Having exhibited an impartial approach towards political parties for a long time, TUSIAD adopted a strict manner in opposition to Ecevit's government in May 1979. The Association presented their criticisms about the general approach of the government to public opinion by means of newspaper advertisements. These advertisements played a great role in Turkey, a country which was deprived of many things at the time. Thus TUSIAD played a major role in eroding Ecevit's government.

After the 1980 coup, the success of organisations like TUSIAD and TOBB, which were supporters of the military regime and the following Ozal government, triggered the organisational progress of religion-conscious businessmen who were upholding the Islamic capitals as an organisation of MUSIAD (Association of Independent Businessmen) and they brought their power into socio-economic and political play.

Consequently, the organisations of big capitals, although acting together with the military regime and Ozal government, continued to differentiate among themselves.

After permission for the establishment of political parties was granted in 1983 they, by applying some sort of make-up to themselves, went out again into the political arena separately, under the

names of DYP and ANAP. This separation was a reflection of the differentiation between the big capitals.

Meanwhile, the growing religious capitalist class were connecting themselves politically to Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and determining their places in the process of differentiation of big capital organisations.

Consequently, the coalition government of Refah and DYP (Refahyol), prepared a field for religionist capital to establish a compulsory alliance with the secular capitalist class who were supporting DYP. Of course, this obligatory alliance did not work.

Using the big newspapers and broadcasting companies, secular sections of the large capitalist class formed a new alliance, making a current issue with a public action of "one minute of darkness" and the military interference of the 28th February.

Political divisions in Turkey once more shook the unification between classes. The big capitalist class affected Parliament through the mass of the people, democratic non-governmental organisations including the unions, military bureaucracy, the President and big broadcasting companies together with the Refahyol coalition, had been removed from the political power also as a result of their own incompetence in administrating the country.

Thus, against the "danger of fundamentalism", an ideological alliance was formed which united different groups and different sections of the society on the same line of "secular democracy".-

This situation shows that even in the 21st century, relations between social classes and politics in Turkey do not originate only from economical factors, but also from "ideological formations" which also have an effect upon these relations.

4.ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL GROUPS IN TURKEY

The industrial bourgeoisie had appeared following two main processes. The first process is the accumulation of capital provided by trading activities. In the first years of the Republic, in particular, the state awardings constituted an important support for traders. This support is still being supplied today. Since domestic industry had not developed in those early days, Turkish merchants inclined towards forming alliances with foreign companies. This was because Turkish industry was not able to meet the demands of the developing trade needs. That is why buying foreign goods and selling them in the domestic market has been a very beneficial trade. Meanwhile, rich merchants became Turkish owners of foreign franchisers. This kind of development has been supported by either the formation of companies by the bureaucracy or by foreign firms, or by involving the direct participation of high-ranking bureaucrats in such companies. Sometimes these establishments were even supported by converting them into a monopoly. According to research conducted in 1960, the fathers of 34% of industrialists were themselves traders. The second big group that inherited their father's profession are the bureaucrats with a rate of 17 % (Payaslıoglu, 1961:9). These rates define the efforts made by traders and bureaucrats to establish the industrialist class.

After accumulating sufficient capital funds by trading activities, an "assembly industry" started. Merchants who were previously bringing goods from abroad, now became industrialists. What

they were now doing was to bring the parts of goods that were previously purchased as a whole item, and assemble them in Turkey. Participation of foreign capital in these activities was supported by the government not only because of a deficiency of resources, but also because of inadequate technical knowledge. Thus, foreign dependency and assembly-type production has become the main characteristics of the Turkish economy.

The second phase of the emergence of the industrialist bourgeoisie had been the capital transactions from agriculture. Continuation of landlordship, deprivation of agricultural laborers from any social security, various tax exemptions and favors together with the mechanization of agriculture, speeded up the growth of capital appreciation in the agricultural sector. Thus a flow of capital began towards either trading or banking. In some special conditions, transfers of resources were made via trading or banking in a two-stage process. One of the main reasons for this development is that the agricultural capitalists tend towards trading as a result of the necessity of marketing agricultural products.

As a conclusion to the stages explained above, the industrial capitalists began to organise themselves in big "holding companies" that comprised activities of manufacturing, trading and, rarely, banking. Actually, since distribution and marketing of one product is much more profitable than solely producing it, big capitalists were, apart from producing their products, generally keeping their distribution also well under their own control. Although government awardings take an important part in trading because of the marketing opportunities that they offer, rapidly growing domestic markets and in some special cases, foreign markets, have brought a significant sale insurance for the growing Turkish industry.

STRUCTURE OF CAPITALIST CLASSES

Rather crudely, the Turkish bourgeoisie can be divided into four main groups. The first group is composed of agricultural capitalists. This group involves landowners who commonly use modern farming equipment. They generally grow products like cotton on their vast fields. The second group consists of the trading sector. Those involved in this group are normally engaged in foreign trading in addition to their domestic activities. They are often holders of foreign franchising companies. The third group is composed of small manufacturers. Most of the manufacturers in this group seek for great profits which they may obtain in the shortest possible time. That is why this group can involve many newly established companies which are separated from another, much larger, one. The fourth group involves big industrialists. They tend to be organised in large holding companies. The activities of these companies involve trading, banking and even insurance. The main reason for this tendency is the desire of these capitalist classes to reach a position which is financially self-sufficient. Despite using most of the credit resources of the economy, their continual financial straits forced them into this way of working. Another characteristic of this group is being greatly dependent upon foreign resources of capital, technical knowledge and skill, and partly-manufactured goods.

As a last point, we mention that within these four groups there are also many big sections which differentiate from others in many aspects.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF THE CAPITALIST CLASSES

Among the groups briefly mentioned above, significant conflicts of interest exist (above, these groups are classified theoretically in order to be able to analyze them. In reality, the groups are not so clearly differentiated from each other and nearly all of them have some interaction with others). Latterly, the conflicts existing amongst these groups also reflect upon the political arena.

Big industrialists, although maybe only in appearance, started to defend principles of the "social welfare state" such as increasing and just taxation systems and social justice. However the other three groups, in order to benefit increasingly from both workforce and consumers alike, want audits of economic activities to be abolished. Moreover, they demand more facilities by the state such as providing the private sector with loans and tax immunity. Meanwhile, small manufacturers intensely oppose the foreign effect upon the economy, because cooperation with foreign companies means a threat to the existence of small manufacturers. In spite of all this opposition, big bourgeoisie that were already in cooperation with foreign enterprises, prepared themselves ready for the final and complete unification that was achieved (though incompetently) through the Customs Union.

Actually the contradiction which appeared between the small manufacturer and the big capitalist originates mainly from ideological causes because it is obvious that the small manufacturer is dependent upon large capital and consequently upon foreign capital. **Ayata** states the situation thus: "Small manufacturers make intensive use of the products of great companies with adequate capital. Apart from raw materials, there are also tools, machines, energy and other side products among them. Today, even a little family textile workshop uses imported looms, factory produced threads and electricity. In any country, steady growth of the by-product industry is the most important indicator of the dependence of small manufacturers upon large-scale industry." (Ayata, 1987:19)

The relationship which emerged between the capitalist classes is very interesting and also worrying. Undeveloped bourgeoisie who wish to achieve high levels of exploitation are demanding state support and are spending considerable amount of effort against imperialism at the same time. In response to this, the big bourgeoisie claim both the necessity of unification with the West and also desire a state subsidy for themselves.

By change in economic policies of governments, relations between the big capitalists and other various sectors also change in character. After the 1983 elections, the impression of "closeness" to some big groups depicted by the government is one of the events which reveals the contradictions of the capitalist classes among themselves.

BIG CAPITAL AND POLITICAL ISLAM

Within the framework of the events which happened after 1980, the big capitalists in Turkey, as great patrons of the military coup, supported both the military regime and the Ozal government.

During this period, after supporting the private sector by every means, both the capital accumulation of holding companies and the real production (although well under expectations) increased (Sonmez, 1988, Ulagay, 1987).

Meanwhile, a further development occurred due to the political preferences of both the military regime and Ozal: In parallel to political Islam in gaining strength, the "capitals of religionist groups" also got stronger.

Actually, the "political Islam" was left out of the process of creating a "national bourgeoisie" during the transition term from Empire to nation-state, since they lacked a considerable amount of capital (Gocek, 1996:141). From this point of view, gaining the support of the state provided them with a sudden great advantage.

Bulut divides the development of religionist capital in Turkey in five periods:

The first period is between 1923 and 1950. Since governors of the new Republic regarded Islam as their political rival, they were also controlling them economically. During this period, religionist capitalists only tried to preserve what they already had...

The second period is between 1950 and 1973. During this period, the Democrat Party and its successor AP (Party of Justice) not only tolerated political Islam, they also established collaboration with religionist groups. However, the Islamic Parties had still not been allowed to survive. Because of this, the period had been a term in which Islamic companionships developed instead. Some religionist groups close to government benefited from bank loans and other economic facilities. Thus, the religion-conscious capitalist class established small and middle-sized firms and started to organise themselves in the service, government, administration, banking and import-export sectors. Franchising in the agricultural sector in Anatolia started during this period.

After 1970, religious capitalists had begun to establish relations with other sectors in domestic and foreign economy. Sections of these groups which became a kind of bourgeoisie due to state support, vote for AP, whereas those who had to get by by their own means supported Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party).

The third period is between 1973 and 1983. Religious capitalists developed from being small or middle-size enterprises into big capital companies. They continued investing in textile, metal and wood products together with food and agriculture. Establishing external relations, firming-up the existing relations with domestic companies and turning towards wholesaling from retailing are all results of this period. The religious capitalist class learnt how to compete in accordance with the rules of marketing and at the same time, guiding customers according to their own communal relations. They also combined with banking systems and interest in this period.

The fourth period is between 1983 and 1994. The most significant characteristic of this period is the freedom provided for the religious capitalist class through the government under the rule of Ozal. They started to be concerned with investment in Islamic banking and petroleum. They also started to develop tourism and service sectors during this period. Interest-free banking systems that work on the basis of distributing a share of the profits and commerce of foreign exchange had also developed during this period. Also some companies whose capital came from donations and founders and whose names are used only symbolically were established. During this time, by collecting most of the religious capitalist class under its umbrella, MUSIAD had also achieved great progress.

The fifth period is the stage following 1994. The religious capitalist class, being involved in the work of municipalities, started to benefit from facilities provided by local government. Since it had gained an ample strength, the religionist capitalist class who also demand a share from privatisation, combined its power with the establishment of the Refahyol coalition. After Erbakan left the government, despite losing their coalition with the central authority, they continued benefiting from local governments (Bulut, 1997b:256-263).

As a result of all these events, the big capital went into a partition of "Islamic capital" and "secular capital" within itself, a very peculiar development that could only happen in Turkey.

This partition gave a new dimension to the division that was defined by the opposition against of big groups who mainly engaged in assembly manufacturing and had low competence, and the support of highly competent manufacturers who held international licences in Europe and the Customs Union.

Although it seemed that entering the Customs Union has eradicated this partition, competition

between the big holding companies is getting more severe as they approach closer to a "centralist" position and start obtaining new attributes in directing the national policy.

BIG CAPITALISTS GAINING LIMITLESS POWER: PRIVATISED MEDIA

Being established just after the 1980 coup, the Ozal government added another definitive concept into the social structure: First in principle, and then legally, the monopoly of TRT (Turkish Radio Television) that was constitutionally secured has been eradicated.

No doubt this development, abrogating the state control over mass communication means which in itself was to emphasize a democratical progress, made another "controlling" concept a current issue:

The big capitalists were the strongest deciders of public opinion no more. Holding companies that owned at least one or more national Television channels and at least one or more national newspapers, together with a range of magazines and radio stations, obtained tremendous power in directing public opinion in Turkey.

These holding companies used this power expressly to affect voters prior to elections by misreporting the results of opinion polls.

Sometimes they severely and violently attacked each other as in capturing a share from the privatisation of state enterprises. And yet they sometimes exerted an impact upon public opinion and political structures by combining with democratic mass organisations and crowds of people as in the action of "Suffer one minute of darkness in order to later enjoy brightness for ever".

Meanwhile, the Islamic capitalists also kept in step with these events and in order to affect public opinion, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, started to use as propaganda a Sharia law as their basic programme through their own broadcasting companies.

Interestingly, since the position of High Commission (RTUK) that was established to inspect the mass communication means were occupied by the representatives of political parties, the inspection of these means had been carried out not on the basis of public conscience and occupational-ethical principles, but according to the bargain between political balances and political parties.

Thus, the degeneration of politics prevented a serious investigation to be carried out over the mass communication means, and the limitless power that the big capitalists exerted upon the public could not be precluded.

Moreover, the big capitalists could not be prevented from using their media power to affect their economical relations with the state and a big monopoly was tending to appear.

The act of breaking the bounds around the mass communication means which are shortly described as media, was even more effective during the government established in 1997 under the Prime Ministry of Mesut Yılmaz because this government was established with great support and contributions by the media.

In line with these developments, the Turkey of the 21st century is not obliged to live anymore

with a media which boosts consumer desires and tends to create a public opinion that is parallel to the interests of the big capitalists (who are actually quite heterogeneous due to political and economical differences within themselves).

Naturally, in addition to the drawbacks mentioned above, this uncontrolled growth of media is a great problem that triggers dangerous tendencies like violence on one hand and, on the other, introduces a system of decadent and worthless values that has already lost all of its references into the society.

This evolution of the media will seem to be the greatest problem and will cause a big "moral crisis" in Turkey if it will join with the illicit and wild plundering that sprout among trespassers in cities (gecekondular) and combine with political corruption.

Concluding the examination of different sections of capitalist classes, we must mention about two important warnings. *Firstly*, it should be considered that the groups that are roughly classified above, are placed into these classifications according to theoretical principles. In reality, various economical activities (like trading, industry and banking) that define these groups cannot be considered separate from each other in abstract term. On the contrary, these activities depict intense intersections. *Secondly*, we must mention that Turkey still continues fast on her evolution course. Because of this, the undeveloped bourgeoisie is also growing fast and commingles with big bourgeoisie as their capital amount reaches certain levels. Because of these two reasons, interest conflicts between different sections of capitalist classes and their contradicting positions is only temporary. In the future, all of the capitalist classes will come together economically and politically under the big bourgeoisie. However, this differentiation is still sufficient for them to support diverse political parties although most of them are rightists.

We should again mention conclusively that evolutions and developments observed in capitalist classes gained acceleration after becoming integrated with general tendencies for changing in Turkey.

All destroying effects of plundering culture of squatters' settlements and spreading of bribery and corruption in politics together with uncontrolled broadcast of media prepared a supportive ground for owners of mass communication means to direct the society towards this result by forming a "demand" and "rating" accordingly.

Despite all this pessimistic picture, we should confidently believe that all these problems caused because of mass communication means can only be solved by again the free use of these means and in this respect, we must trust in public responsiveness and sensations of our society.

How ever these formations and developments had been arranged under a comprehensive control in the whole world, in time, the same things will also apply in Turkey.

Possession and inspection of mass communication means in the 21st century will become a very important current issue of the public opinion.

5.DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING CLASS

Working class first appeared when a foreign dependent economy started to develop in the 19th century in Ottoman Empire. The working class was weak and unorganised within the Ottoman Empire's social and economical structure. However, there were still some collective labor actions

even though at a low level (Sencer, O., 1969a:90). On the other hand, before the second Constitutional Monarchy, the number of individual strikes had reached 27 in 1908 and laborers achieved afterwards a significant class formation (Sulker, 1973:12-17). This development attracted the reaction of "Ittihad ve Terakki" (Party of Union and Progress): Therefore, all strikes were banned by a law promulgated for the purpose (Okcun, 1982).

In Ottoman Empire, business relations were regulated with Majalla (Civil Code). However, there were no regulation covering relations between the employer and the employee in this religion-based code. The first law regulating working conditions was promulgated in 1865. This law which comprised 100 articles and called "Dilaver Pasha Nizamnamesi" (Regulation of Dilavar Pasha), was mostly about increasing the productivity rather than providing social securities to the workers (Talas, 1961:83-84). Later in 1869 another regulation was made which was called "Maadin Nizamnamesi". This "Nizamname" (Regulation) prohibited drudgery and forced labor and provided insurance for work accidents.

WORK REGULATIONS DURING THE REPUBLIC PERIOD

During the Republic period, the first precaution about working was taken in 1921. In those years, since coal was the only energy source used during the War of Independence, it was crucially important for the production to carry on in coal mines without any termination. In order to provide that, for the first time a regulation which defines the workday, the lowest age of working, minimum wage, supplying pensions and health insurance was made at the beginning of the Republic period (Talas, 1960:12-17).

After 1923, the young Republic was trying to fortify the bourgeoisie by taking necessary economical measures on one hand and on the other, it banned completely all type of labor organisations and activities. In 1936, a labor law was promulgated. This law provided the working class with "social securities" but prohibited to go on strike. The general approach of governments during this period was towards preventing the working class who were a threat for the development of the bourgeoisie, from gaining a comprehension (Kongar, 1972c:163).

1945 and 1946 were the years when a crossroad for the Turkish social policy was determined. In these years, *first* the Ministry of Labor was formed. *Second*, within the frame of establishing the democracy, the ban over establishing organisations based upon classes and interests was abrogated. In parallel to this, unions and socialist parties have been founded. However, after a short time in 1946, both unions and socialist parties were closed by the martial law (martial order that was imposed during the Second World War was still going on then).

In 1947, the law of unions was promulgated. The Republican People's Party, in order to keep the working class under control, began to assist them in organising the unions. On the other hand, some unions had combined together with the Democrat Party. Because the Democrat Party adopted a defensive position for the labor rights.

When the Democrat Party came into power in 1950, hardly any change was done to the working conditions. Only, labor organisations that were supporting two different parties were united in this term. In July 1952, "Turkish Confederation of Labor Unions (Turk-Is)" was established. However, until 1960, this federation could not achieve a significant success, either. Because the vicious bickers between the two parties and preventive measures taken by the Democrat Party oppressed and diverted the labor action from its main course.

SITUATION AFTER THE 1960 COUP: GRANTING WORKERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

After the 1960 coup, Turk-Is managed to establish relations with international labor organisations. It was also granted an important amount of money from the American aid program. The 1961 Constitution granted workers the right for strike. After all these events, in order to ameliorate the rights of workers, Turk-Is adopted a non-political activism. This happened mainly because of the encouragement of the American government.

As reaction to this kind of attitude, on 13th February 1967 a new confederation called, "Revolutionist Confederation for Labor Unions (DISK)" was established. DISK was believing that they have to act within a political party in order to ameliorate the rights of workers. Thus, an organic link was established between some part of working class and Turkish Workers' Party.

Turk-Is began to think over their non-political policy after the capitalist developments in the country and the emergence of a strong working class after state supports. A group called "social democrats" within Turk-Is were supporters of this approach. Conclusively on 15th January 1975, Halil Tunc, head of Turk-Is, first time announced, "for the Turkish workers activity, the term of non-political policy is now closed" and also stated that they would reveal soon which political party that they support (Milliyet, 16th January 1975). No doubt this approach was a result of a strengthened working class. Actually, reactions against the concept of "non-political unionisation" within Turk-Is were becoming stronger after DISK was formed (Isikli, 1974:515-537). Meanwhile, many Turkish workers went to Western Europe to work and they learned there the European type of unionisation. After they returned Turkey, these workers affected the Turkish unionisation activity in this direction (Abadan, N., 1964:161-162). However, Turk-Is insisted on following the "non-political unionisation" policy. Anyhow, it was impossible for Turk-Is to support a specific political party since it was involving many types of political tendencies.

STATE EFFECT AFTER 1960: SUPPORTING LABOR RIGHTS

Appearance of working class and the role of state in this development was explained by Ecevit as this: "The period between the advancement of social and economical conscience and apprehension, and obtaining some consent through legal and constitutional means form the most important recollections of Turkish labor history. Really, in the agitated years of 1962 and 1963, political and cultural attitudes of workers had determined the direction of their future actions. At the beginning, workers themselves organised big meetings without any initiation or support of any elite group or university students. In those meetings, workers criticized social and economical unfairness and demanded measures projected by the new Constitution to be taken. Workers walked with bare feet to Izmir and Istanbul which are the central cities for works and industry.

"In the capital city they completed a similar walk on the steps of the Parliament Building. Slogans written against the "greedy bosses" and "foul capitalists" were seen first in those meetings.

"As soon as the Parliament made the law of collective bargaining, strikes and lockout and the new law of unions, anxiety, critics and walks of workers ended and instead, they gained a self-esteem because of their professions.

"Six months after the promulgation of these two law, Turk-Is had held its General Assembly meeting in Bursa. During the meeting, a leader of one union, unthinkingly used the term "barefooted Turkish workers". Then many members, including those who organised the barefoot walks, jumped to their feet and shouted "this is a false-accusation!", "...This is an insult to Turkish

workers, they are not barefooted!", the very confused speaker apologised saying that he did not mean to define workers as barefooted, but that he wanted to explain that to buy a pair of shoes is even very difficult for workers." (Ecevit, 1973:153:154)

Lines above determines at least two realities about working class in Turkey. *The first reality* is that the rights of workers are granted constitutionally (by the Turkish political elite, namely etatist-elitists) to Turkish workers without any need for them to fight. The second reality is that Turkish workers do not see themselves as somebody who does not have anything to loose. Verifying this generalisation, as workers' level of "continuity" and "organisation" rise, their expectations for the future also rise (Oskay, 1983:240). Because of all these realities, Turkish working class who also want to participate in the political power, is always using legal means for their struggle.

The 1980 coup terminated all union activities and use of workers' rights. Moreover, the heads of DISK and MİSK were arrested and all possessions of Confederations were confiscated.

The 1982 Constitution that was declared during the military regime brought serious limitations to workers' rights and political activities of labor organisations. Due to these limitations, all political activities of unions and confederations were prohibited.

The same approach continued during the Ozal government. E. Unsal explains this period like this: "Between 1980 and 1990 the principle of impartiality was not observed by the government during regulating relations between employers and employees and strikes were frequently postponed and an attitude preferential towards employers was adopted. Policies followed by the government has turned our country into a paradise for cheap labor. In this period, public sector employers, through the agency of Public Employers Union, followed a low-wage policy and forced the private sector employers to act in the same way. In this period of time, workers had to live under the yoke of low-wage and high inflation. Even TUSIAD admitted that the labor wages were the lowest payments among all other costs in a workplace between 1980 and 1990 and some people even suggested giving special compensations to these workers." (Unsal, E., 1997:13-14)

Workers also suffered the consequences of the 24th January decisions during this period.

After the 1991 elections, a hope for some improvement appeared, but unfortunately not much change was conducted. Because the Gulf Crisis broke out at this time, an economical strait and non-unionisation tendencies also started out.

New stabilisation measures taken in 1994 also diversely affected labor organisations.

Only in 1995, same constitutional amendments could be carried out.

The new law of unions with number 4277 which promulgated in 1997, unions regained their rights for performing political activities.

However, in the time elapsed, workers have lost their ambition for politics and at the same time unions have weakened.

Because of the general atmosphere in the country caused workers to stay away from unions.

Union's loss of strength was still continuing at the beginning of the 21st century. In this respect, the number of workers who are members of a union which was previously one million, had even more decreased in 1996.

In this atmosphere, for the new law to be promulgated did not provoke any excitement among the unions.

In this emotionless attitude against politics, there was of course the share of artificial partition of

political structure and the apathy of political parties, including those claim themselves as social democrats, towards labor unions.

Actually, after the 1980 coup, the working class was later deprived from their rights that were granted to them after the 1960 coup. In one respect, neither the granting, nor taking away of these rights were the natural results of social change and progress. Since both of the events were merely the actions of governments that were ruling at the time, working class did not exhibit a great reaction in both cases.

In the 21st century, under the effect of "globalisation", Turkey will also continue applying low-wage policy for a while, suiting to the general conjuncture of the world.

However one thing must not be forgotten that while the capitalist class gain more power, the working class will also get stronger.

Although the technology of 21st century has weakened the relations between the workers, the production and the labor-value theory, it is inevitable for Turkey, a country proceeding from being a "satellite state " towards being a "central state" to live the historical results of this development.

In other words, the 21st century will witness the working class in Turkey re-emerging as an organised and democratically conscious pressure group. This inclination is also suits to the stages of "questioning the representative democracy" and "participation" that will become a current issue in Turkey in the future. This matter will be discussed later.

Isikli's judgment upon this issue lights the way for the future:

"Relation between democratisation and workers' actions comprises two sides. On one hand, as it is very true to say that democratisation is crucially necessary for the labor action to gain approval and on the other hand, it is also true to say that for the democratisation to gain reality is dependent upon the formation and effectiveness of the labor action." (Isikli, 1994:10)

Here, this double-sided relation between the "democratisation process" and the "labor action" can be considered as a sign indicating that in the 21st century the labor organisations will again play important roles in our social and political lives.

TABLE (X) – (1)
NUMBER OF WORKERS WHO ARE UNION MEMBERS
(1963-1980)

Years	Number of Paid Workers	Number of Union Members	Proportion of Union Members to Paid Workers
1963	2,745,000	296,000	10,8
1967	3,310,000	613,000	18,5
1971	4,055,000	1,200,000	29,6
1975*	4,200,000	1,800,000	42,8
1980**	4,500,000	1,300,000	28,8
1985***	4,500,000	1,400,000	31,1

Years	Number of Paid Workers	Number of Union Members	Proportion of Union Members to Paid Workers
1990	6,500,000	1,460,000	22,5
1995	6,500,000	1,080,000	16,6
1996	6,500,000	960,000	14,8

SOURCE: T.R. Ministry of Labor, no date:117.

* Calculated from TR. The Official Gazette, No. 15485:82.

** Approximately calculated from DPT, 1984:245; DIE, 1984:124.

*** Calculated as rounded figures from Petrol-Is, 1997:519; DIE, 1988:180; DIE, 1997a:267.

TABLES CONCERNING DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING CLASS

Development of working class in Turkey can be observed through the increase of members of unions. As can be seen from the Table (X) – (1), starting from 1960, membership to unions spread very quickly. However, after 1980, due to prohibitions, a stagnation term was lived. Then, the number of one million workers having a union membership, had gone down below one million after 1996.

On the other hand, we saw that workers actions in order to obtain more share from the national income intensified after they gained their labor organisations after 1960. Strikes that were carried out from 1965 to 1980 are shown on Table (X) – (2). This Table reveals some truths about strikes. *Firstly*, strikes in private sector are more than those in public sector. This means, capitalists and directors of factories act much more slowly than those in public sector in accepting the demands of workers. The differentiation between private and public sector is more striking when wages given in two sectors are compared. As can be seen from the Table (X) – (5), wages paid in the public sector are higher than wages paid in the private sector. What is interesting here is that the same trend still carried on in 1990s as seen on Table (X) – (5). Whereas traditionally, the state act on the side of private enterprisers about issues relating to workers (Fisek, K., 1969:174-190; Unsal, E., 1997:14).

**TABLE (X) – (2)
STRIKES (1965-1980)**

Years	Public		Private		Total	Manufacturing	
	n	%	n	%		n	%
1965	5	11,6	38	88,4	43	34	79,1
1966	5	12,8	34	87,4	39	27	69,2
1967	40	44	51	56	91	39	42,8

Years	Public		Private		Total	Manufacturing	
	n	%	n	%		n	%
1968	9	15,3	50	84,7	59	36	61
1969	22	26,8	60	73,2	82	46	56,1
1970	50	45,1	61	54,9	111	66	59,5
1971	30	30,9	67	69,1	97	62	63,9
1972*	4	28,6	10	71,4	14	9	64,3
1973	7	31,8	15	68,2	22	14	63,6
1974	22	48,9	23	51,1	45	25	55,5
1975	13	14,4	77	85,6	90	59	65,5
1976	22	20,9	83	79,1	105	71	67,6
1977	29	17,3	138	82,7	167	106	63,5
1978	27	15,4	148	84,6	175	99	56,6
1979	46	24,2	144	75,8	190	78	41
1980	30	13,2	197	86,8	227	186	81,9

SOURCE: Calculated from DIE, 1974:179 and TR Official Gazette, No. 15485:83 and DIE, 1979:91-92; DIE, 1983:170.

•Strikes are subject to the permission of the martial law.

Secondly, we can see that strikes in manufacturing sector are more intense. Manufacturing sector represents the highest level capitalist relations, since it involves the most vivid industrial activities. Therefore, it is quite normal to observe more problems occur between the employer and the employee in the manufacturing sector. This situation also suggest that strikes happen more often in big enterprises than in small ones.

TABLE (X) – (3)
STRIKES (1965-1980)

Years	Number of Strikes	Number of Workplaces	Participated Workers
1985	21	21	2,410
1986	21	28	7,926
1987	307	346	29,734
1988	156	266	30,057

Years	Number of Strikes	Number of Workplaces	Participated Workers
1989	171	325	39,435
1990	458	861	166,306
1991	398	686	164,968
1992	98	1,408	62,189
1993	49	178	6,908
1994	36	166	4,782
1995	120	3,369	199,867

SOURCE: DIE, 1997a:291.

Table (X) – (3) depicts the situation of strikes after 1980. As can be seen from the table, in 1987 when proper elections were held and democratisation was restarted, workers also began to pursue their rights more freely.

Another result that can be extracted from the Table (X) – (3) is that in 1987 more strikes happened than in 1980, a year which had the highest rate in strikes compared to previous years.

No doubt this situation was a reaction to limitations applied just after the 1980 coup and an effort to change the general present situation.

Table (X) – (4) shows that female labor force is cheaper than male labor force. Inequalities between male and female workers that are explained thoroughly by Omer Zuhtu Altan, proves that work force market is still affected by social values belong to pre-industrialist term (Altan, 1980).

According to evaluations defined by Turk-Is, number of women in work areas are decreasing. While the rate of women population participating in labor force was 70 % in 1955, this rate went down to 31.9 % in 1995.

Moreover, a more serious situation for women workers is about the payments they are given. Payments of female workers are 20-40 % lower than the payments given to male workers (Turk-Is, 1997:333).

TABLE (X) – (4)
AVERAGE DAILY WAGES
(1965=100)
(1965-1983)
(In Turkish Liras)

Years	Public		Private		Female		Male		Total	
	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator

Years	Public		Private		Female		Male		Total	
	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator	<i>TL</i>	Indicator
1965	22,11	100	21,22	100	17,96	100	22,06	100	21,61	100
1970	38,73	175	32,98	155	32,68	182	35,38	161	35,32	163
1975	98,32	445	78,75	371	74,14	413	86,73	393	85,55	396
1980	525,3	2376	367,35	1731	412,18	2295	428,28	1941	426,96	1976
1983	1,124,62	5086	859,81	4052	96513	5374	942,25	4271	944,37	4370

SOURCE: Institute of Social Security, 1984:20.

TABLE (X) – (5)
AVERAGE NET MONTHLY WAGES
(1991=100)
(1991-1996)

Years	Monthly wages Paid in Public Sector (TL)	Index of Public Wages	Monthly Wages Paid in Private Sector (TL)	Index of Private Sector Wages
1991	2,445,052	100	2,034,368	100
1992	4,491,005	183,7	3,681,907	190
1993	7,793,392	318,7	6,108,701	300,3
1994	15,307,818	626,1	9,968,846	490
1995	23,665,392	967,9	17,028,020	837
1996	32,993,063	1,349,4	31,672,117	1,556,9

SOURCE: Turk-Is, 1997:172.

On Table (X) – (6) and Table (X) – (7) are shown the results of emergence of organised labor force. By effectively using the legal means granted to them, insured part of working class managed to keep their wages above the increase rates of prices. (It should be remembered that this situation is true only for the insured workers whose records can be followed and even these workers' wages are lower than price increases between 1971 and 1972, and between 1979 and 1983). This situation is closely related to the working class in Turkey to constitute a significant part of the social, economical and political order in the country. It must be remembered that, the working class to

combine with or separate from the economical and political order is the inevitable result of realities I explained above. That is why, any diminution in worker's net income can be considered as a negative development.

TABLE (X) – (6)
REAL AVERAGE WAGE
(1968-1983)
(1968=100)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Consumer Price Indicator</i>	<i>Real Wage Indicator</i>
1968	100	100
1970	115,2	125,2
1975	244,4	303,1
1980	1,801,5	1,51
1983	4,067,1	3,346,5

SOURCE: Calculated from Institution of Social Security, 1974:35; TR Official Gazette, No.15485:83; and Table (X) – (3); DIE, 1983:391; 1984:225 and Institution of Social Security, 1984:20.

* Average Consumer Price Index of Istanbul and Ankara

When Table (X) – (6) and Table (X) – (7) are examined from this respect, a very grievous picture is depicted: Considering both the average and minimum wage of workers, it can be seen that they are still very far back from the real wages given in 1970s.

Besides, another result depicted by these two tables is that the real wages of workers seriously regressed during the military regime and Ozal government.

If taken into consideration properly, it can be seen that there was a slight improvement during the DYP-SHP coalition, but later it regressed to its previous condition.

In this respect, we can generate these outcomes: In parallel to advancement of organised labor force, real wages are also ameliorated; real wages regress during military regimes; the same thing is applicable to Ozal and Ciller governments; in general, there is a direct relation between democratical rights and freedom and real income of working class.

Another reality observed in this context is that no matter how the situation of working class had been ameliorated by orders given "from superior upper ranks to inferior ranks" in 1960s, their situation was regressed by the limiting and prohibiting orders that were given in the same way "from superior upper ranks to inferior ranks" in 1980s.

When all these issues are taken into consideration, it can be expressed that the advancement of

working class in Turkey, is proportional to democratisation and development of the country and that in the 21st century, worker's rights and labor organisations will get stronger in parallel to the advancements of "non-governmental organisations" together with democratisation activities.

TABLE (X) – (7)
REAL MINIMUM WAGE
(1979-1996)
(1979=100)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Average Monthly Net Minimum Wage</i>	<i>Living Index</i>	<i>Average Real Net Minimum Wage</i>
1979	100	100	100
1980	112,9	194,3	58,1
1985	686,4	1,001,4	68,5
1990	6,780,2	8,938,6	75,8
1995	130,267,11	175,240,2	74,3
1996	277,577,2	316,133,2	87,8

SOURCE: Bagdadioglu, Kupeli, 1997:32.

STUATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABORERS: POVERTY

Industrial workers are the most developed part of the labor force in Turkey. However, they do not represent the whole of the working class. Towards the end of the 1990s, 48 % of labor force were still working on agricultural fields (DIE, 1997:266). Agricultural laborers are also deprived of union membership and social securities. Because of this, they have to work under bad conditions, for very low wages.

Most of the agricultural population comprised of family enterprises that are mostly below the level of self-sufficiency in agricultural production. In 1970s, agricultural income that were gained from the 52.1 % of all agricultural industry was not meeting the daily necessary expenses. 43.7 % of them can carry on living in the lowest standards. The rate of agricultural industries whose income is more than their expenses is only 4.1 % (DPT, 1970:34-36). Besides, as expected, the lowest value-added rate per worker is applied to this sector (DPT., 1984:237).

In the agricultural sector, the inequities both between the public and private enterprises and between wages of male and female workers are much more evident. In 1996, seasonal agricultural workers in public sector were gaining 29.3 % more income than those who work in private sector. This rate is more than 100 % for permanent agricultural workers.

Female workers are working in much worse conditions. In seasonal works, female workers in public sector gain 43.5 % more than those who work in private sector. Namely, female workers in

public sector gain more than male workers in private sector. And permanent female workers in public sector gain 186.5 % more than those who work in private sector, which means female workers in private sector are being exploited at this rate. (Kepenek, 1998).

As will be shown in the section of income distribution, agricultural population of Turkey in the 21st century are poorer than urban population.

Capitalist developments in Turkey are also far from solving unemployment problem. According to even conservative calculations, the number of unemployed people in 1983 was over 2.5 million (DPT, 1984:236). In addition to this, continually growing service sector is the indicator for continually growing secret unemployed population. The total number of unemployed population in 1994 was 4 million, 2 million of whom were explicitly unemployed and 2 million of whom were hidden unemployed. (TR. Official Gazette, 1995:180)

6. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AS THE INDICATOR OF SOCIAL CLASSES

In every society, researches carried out for revealing the income distribution reach the real data in the most difficult way. Especially in Turkey, a country where research activities are not very common and people tend to hide their real income level, therefore reliability of such researches will always be debatable.

However, if similar results are achieved through researches carried out with different methods and conducted by different institutions within the same period of time, then we can obtain a rough guide about the general appearance of the income distribution.

In the Table (X) – (8), a detailed information about income distribution are given.

TABLE (X) – (8)
INCOME DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT RESEARCHES
CONDUCTED IN DIFFERENT YEARS UPON 20 % DIVISION GROUPS

<i>Research Calculation-Group-Year</i>	<i>Share of the poorest 20%</i>	<i>Share of the second 20%</i>	<i>Share of the third 20%</i>	<i>Share of the forth 20%</i>	<i>Share of the richest 20 %</i>
DPT-1963					
Turkey	4,5	8,5	11,5	18,5	57
Boratav-1963					
Turkey	4,2	6,4	10,7	17,7	61
Boratav-1963					
Turkey-Agricultural	6	9,2	13,8	21,4	49,6
Boratav-1963					
Turkey-Out of Agriculture	3,4	5,8	9,7	17,5	63,6

<i>Research Calculation-Group-Year</i>	<i>Share of the poorest 20%</i>	<i>Share of the second 20%</i>	<i>Share of the third 20%</i>	<i>Share of the fourth 20%</i>	<i>Share of the richest 20 %</i>
Boratav-1963					
Turkey-salaried	6,6	9,7	14,4	21,8	47,5
Bulutay, Timur, Ersel-1968					
Turkey-DPT	3	7	10	20	60
DPT-1973					
Turkey	3,5	8	12,5	19,5	56,5
Celasun-1978					
Turkey	2,8	7,3	13	22,1	54,7
DIE-1978-1979					
Turkey	4,7	0,89	14,6	25,3	46,5
Celasun-1983					
Turkey	2,6	6,9	12,6	21,4	55,9
TUSIAD-1986					
Turkey	3,9	8,4	12,6	19,2	55,9
DIE-1987					
Turkey	5,2	9,6	14,1	21,2	49,9
KAMAR-1988					
Turkey	3,1	9	12,2	16,6	59,1
DIE-1994					
Turkey	4,9	8,6	12,6	19	54,9
DIE-1994					
Turkey-Urban	4,8	8,2	11,9	17,9	57,2
DIE-1994					
Turkey-Rural	5,6	10,1	14,8	21,8	47,7

SOURCE: Bulutay, Timur, Ersel, 1971:16; Boratav 1972:195-196; DPT, 1976:24; DIE, 1983:187; Celasun, 1986; Esmer, Fisek, Kalaycioglu, 1986; Kongar, 1989; Turk-Is, 1997:208; DIE, 1997a:629.

In the Table, results of various researches and calculations conducted from 1963 to 1994 are shown.

One part of these results is based on the field studies of DPT, DIE, KAMAR and TUSIAD. Another part is based on the calculations made upon data obtained by researches conducted by Celasun, Boratav and Bulutay.

This data about income distribution in Turkey is arranged according to groups of one fifth of the

whole population. Despite using completely different methods, for researches to comprise results supporting each other, makes them more reliable to study upon.

The most important problem we see here is the changing trends of income distribution in considered years.

Assuming that comparison can only be possible between researches that are conducted with similar methods, figures of State Institute of Statistics (DIE) can then be regarded meaningful for years between 1987 and 1994.

As can be seen on Table (X) – (8), the main feature of income distribution of Turkey is the obvious iniquity.

In rough terms; whilst one fifth of the poorest part of the population, that is the lowest paid 20 % of the whole society, take about the 3-5 % of national income, whereas the richest one fifth of the population, that is the highest paid, 20 % of the society gain the 50-60 % of national income which is more than half of the national income.

Reflecting a very awry income distribution, this type of national income sharing tend to get worse in time, instead of becoming better.

Results of policies that impair the income distribution, a situation which are normally perceived through indicators like tax regulations, domestic liabilities and interest rates, can also be revealed from data of comparable researches.

For example, while Cini coefficient in 1987 research of DIE was 0.43, it raised to 0.49 in the 1994 research of the Institution (Turk-Is, 1997:208).

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AMONG VARIOUS SECTORS

Another picture depicted by the Table (X) – (8) is that income distribution in rural areas are less variant than in urban areas, in other words, income distribution in rural areas is more just.

However, this must not mislead us about the poverty in the agricultural sector. Despite having less differentiation of income than urban areas, it does not make much sense sharing justly the poverty caused by low income in rural areas. As can be seen from the Table (X) – (9), *agricultural sector that involves half of the whole working population, can only obtain a quarter of the national income.*

Another reality that can be perceived from the Table (X) – (9) is that the income distribution in Turkey is not very variant in respect to agriculture, but it shows great differences for also other sectors that appear relating to economical activities and thus, iniquity axes are also emerged among various sectors.

TABLE (X) – (9) NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND INCOME PERCENTAGE

ACCORDING TO ECONOMICAL ACTIVITIES

<i>Branch of economical activity</i>	<i>Turkey</i>		<i>Urban Area</i>		<i>Rural Area</i>	
	<i>Numerical percentage</i>	<i>Income rate</i>	<i>Numerical percentage</i>	<i>Income rate</i>	<i>Numerical percentage</i>	<i>Income rate</i>
Agriculture	50.3	23.3	9.3	3.2	79.0	59.8
Mining	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.7
Manufacturing Industry	13.9	17.8	27.1	23.6	4.6	7.4
Energy	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.7
Construction	4.8	6.1	7.9	7.4	2.7	3.7
Trading	13.7	26.9	25.1	34.8	5.7	12.5
Transportation & Communication	3.7	7.0	6.4	8.5	1.9	4.4
Services of Banking, Insurance and Real Estate	1.7	3.4	3.6	4.6	0.4	1.1
Social & Personal Services	11.0	14.0	19.7	16.9	4.8	8.7

SOURCE: DIE, 1997a:630.

For example, although we can ignore energy sector since its number is very small, we can see that sectors of trading, transportation-communication and banking-insurance obtain income which is twice as much as their share in the population.

Despite being a little old, results of a very interesting analysis is depicted on Table (X) – (10). Although conducted from a different classification, a more recent income distribution is depicted on Table (X) – (11).

TABLE (X) – (10)
SHARES OF VARIOUS PROFESSION GROUPS
IN NATIONAL POPULATION AND INCOME
1968

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Share in the population %</i>	<i>Share Taken from the National Income %</i>
---------------	--------------------------------------	---

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Share in the population %</i>	<i>Share Taken from the National Income %</i>
Big Merchant and Industrialist	0.55	3.51
Merchant	2.27	11.09
Self-employed	0.66	3.76
High Bureaucrat	1.06	2.59
Low Bureaucrat	7.64	9.20
Technicians	0.59	0.77
Small Traders and Craftsman	15.56	14.75
Qualified Worker	6.44	7.60
Unqualified Worker	11.35	7.23
Farmer	49.57	38.77
Agricultural laborer	4.31	0.73

SOURCE: **Bulutay, Timur, Ersel**, 1971:180.

Table (X) – (10) shows the places of various classes and groups within the population and their shares they obtain from the national income. Since the shares taken from the national income constitute the main data about the living conditions of classes in Turkey, this table provides important evidences about the structures of classes in our country. As can be clearly seen from the table, agricultural laborers, farmers and unqualified workers are at the worst position in respect to distribution of the national income. On the other hand, although bureaucrats are seen as a group gaining a share from the national income which is higher than their rates within the population, the real situation is actually not like this. These groups generally tend to hide the real amount of income they earn. However, since the official incomes of bureaucrats are fixed, for them to hide their income is impossible (Bulutay, Timur, Ersel, 1971:180).

As of 1968, qualified workers (those in manufacturing industry) as well, obtain a little more income than their rate within the population. This was the natural result of developed unionisation trend after 1963. This way of progress of unionisation would positively affect also the unqualified workers. However, frequent cessation applied on using labor rights prevented the achievement of a positive development.

It can be perceived from the Table that traders obtain the biggest amount of income which is much higher than their rate within the population. The same is roughly applied to industrialists and self-employed persons. Small traders and craftsmen however, obtain a share from the national income lower than their rate in the whole population. One reason for this situation is the low technology they use. For the organisational level of these groups to be quite low is another reason of this situation.

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME WITHIN THE SECTORS: EVEN GREATER INIQUITIES

When Table (X) – (10) is analyzed together with Table (X) – (9), some interesting results can be obtained. The rate of first four groups who obtain the highest shares from the national income in the whole population reaches 4.5 %. In return however, they obtain a share which constitutes 20.9 % of the national income. On the other hand, according to data shown on Table (X) – (9), the richest group of people who comprise only the 20 % of the population, receive 55 % of the national income. In this case, there is a group apart from those who are shown on Table (X) – (10), who form the 15 % of the population and receive 35 % of the national income. In order to determine this group of people, we can re-examine the Table (X) – (10). There, we can see that only small traders, craftsmen and farmers may comprise the rest of the richest 20 %. Because, incomes of other approximately fit in certain amounts. However, interestingly, the share received by the group of traders and craftsmen and the group of farmers are less than their rate within the population. In this case, the richest 15 % group of the population most likely among these two groups and this makes the income difference between the small farmers, small traders and craftsmen very big. Since they own big manufactures, agricultural sector is most likely involve groups with high incomes. Because of this, this sector most probably comprise the richest group. Therefore, it would not be untrue to state that the income distribution among the agricultural sector is the most unjust.

TABLE (X) – (11)
SHARES OF VARIOUS PROFESSION GROUPS
IN EMPLOYED POPULATION AND INCOME
(1994)

Profession Groups	Turkey		Urban Areas		Rural Areas	
	<i>Rate in the employed population %</i>	<i>Share received from the National Income</i>	<i>Rate in the employed population %</i>	<i>Share received from the National Income</i>	<i>Rate in the employed population %</i>	<i>Share received from the National Income</i>
Technicians	5.0	8.6	9.5	11.1	1.8	4.1
Enterprisers and managers	2.2	8.5	4.4	11.8	0.8	2.4
Managerial staff	4.1	5.5	7.8	7.0	1.5	2.7
Trading and Sales Personnel	8.4	21.7	15.8	28.8	3.2	8.7
Workers in services	7.2	7.8	12.5	9.1	3.5	5.5
Workers in Agriculture	50.2	23.3	9.4	3.3	78.8	59.7
Workers in non-agricultural fields	22.2	23.6	39.2	27.6	10.2	16.6
Unknown	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.3	0.2	0.3

SOURCE: DIE, 1997a:630.

When data shown on Table (X) – (11) are closely examined, it can be seen that distribution depicted in the previous older Table is very realistic. Income distribution shown on this Table also indicates us that the general iniquities that we analyzed above is still continued today nearly the

same way.

While enterprisers and managers obtain incomes that are nearly four times the rate they comprise in the population, workers in agriculture sector can hardly receive incomes that are half the rate they cover in the population. Meanwhile, in parallel to marketing conditions of Turkey, income shares of trading and sales personnel reach about two and a half times their rates in the population.

TABLE (X) – (12)
INCOME DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO REGIONS OF TURKEY

Regions	1987		1994	
	<i>Household rate</i>	<i>Income rate</i>	<i>Household rate</i>	<i>Income rate</i>
<i>Marmara & Aegean</i>	37.0	45.0	42.3	52.5
<i>Mediterranean</i>	13.4	10.7	12.5	11.0
<i>Central Anatolia</i>	24.3	21.5	17.9	15.4
<i>Black Sea</i>	10.6	8.9	12.8	10.9
<i>East & Southeast Anatolia</i>	14.7	13.9	14.5	10.2

SOURCE: Turk-Is, 1997:209.

As another aspect of the issue, Table (X) – (12) shows income distribution according to different regions in Turkey. As it can be clearly seen from the Table, the income distribution in Turkey is not very fair in relation to regions, either. While regions of Marmara and Aegean receives much more income share than their proportion in the population, the share of all other regions from the national income is much lower than their proportion in the population.

As an interesting point here, the proportion between the population and income of the East and South East regions is not much different than other regions (apart from the Marmara and Aegean regions) of the country. No doubt one of the causes of this situation is the rate of the investments made in these regions by the state to be much higher than taxes received from them. The gap between the rates of regional income and population has increased from 1987 until 1994. This process is most likely the result of PKK terror and preventive and security measures taken against the terrorism in the region.

REFORMATION TRENDS OF THE FUTURE

When data given on the Table above is examined together with the general characteristics of Turkey, it will be possible to define the existence of following reformation tendencies in the country: *Firstly*, we can say that the share of industrialists from the national income will grow even bigger in the future. Because Turkey will continue determinedly (despite being foreign-dependent) on its industrialisation course. Because of this, the share that industrialists receive from the national income will increase and this class of people will strengthen their importance and impact in the society. Since the foreign relations of the country are firmly established, any negative effect that Customs Union may cause over this process is not likely. However, whether or not any fundamental change will occur in the social and economical structure, after a while, this class of society will have to pay much bigger amounts of wages to industrial workers from their share they

obtain from the national income, since, despite the effects of globalisation, our present order is leading towards a "social welfare state".

Secondly, we can also state that the share received by the trading class from the national income will also increase. Both income and impact of this class will also rise because of the increasingly spreading "values of consumption society" and improving market conditions.

Thirdly, it is expected that national income shares of self-employed people will also increase. The absolute necessity of technical information and skill demanded by the society and consequences of increasing social differentiation will be the main causes of this process.

Fourthly, high and low rank bureaucrats are expected to keep the same level of share they receive from the national income. Coefficiency system provides great facilities for governments to arrange wages of civil servants according to inflation rate. Certainly the bureaucracy will know how to use this system corresponding their interests. Besides, increasingly progressing "civil servant" unionisation will exert impacts upon the system towards increasing incomes of the bureaucracy.

Fifthly, shares of technicians from the national income are also expected to increase. The same factors that affect self-employed groups also apply to technicians.

Sixthly, shares of small traders and craftsmen that they receive from the national income will decrease. The industrialisation process which progressively dominates over the society is the reason for this consequence. The perception brought forth by industrialisation about establishing big business enterprises and the technology used in mass production will diminish the incomes of these groups and cause them to become poorer.

Seventhly, along with the continuation of the industrialisation and development of unionisation, undoubtedly, shares of qualified and unqualified workers received from the national income will increase.

Eighthly, very small shares of farmers and agricultural workers that they receive today from the national income will be even smaller in the future. If unionisation would not advance in the agricultural sector, agricultural workers and small family enterprises will become poorer, whereas big enterprisers will become richer. This situation will transform the present gaps among the agricultural incomes into very deep cliffs. However, as the effects of Customs Union will also reduce the income of big enterprisers in agricultural sector, we can state that this sector will generally become poor. Meanwhile, it should be reminded that, as planned or unplanned consequences of reformations, landlordship which is defined by relations similar to feudality, will be eradicated in the near future.

ATTITUDES OF SOME GROUPS TOWARDS REFORMATIONS

Tendencies expected in the future which I tried to explain above, also give important clues about attitudes of various social classes towards changing. There are two main variables that define the reactions of social classes to social and economical changes. *The first* variable is the relation between the proportion of a class to the population and their shares that they receive from the national income. If the rate of national income share is bigger than the proportion to the population, this class will resist the change. Because they are relatively richer than other groups and they will fear that they will be harmed by those changes. On the other hand, if the rate of national income share is less than the proportion to the population, the concerned class will most

likely be in favor of the change. Because the change may increase the share that they take from the national income. As can be understood from this analyze, *the second* main variable is expectations for the future. If one social class anticipate that the change will increase their rate of national income share, they will be affirmative towards the change. However, if one social class fear from an income fall, they will act conservatively or even reactionary against the change.

When we analyze the situations of groups and classes shown on Table (X) – (10) and Table (X) – (11) we encounter with such tendencies: Big traders and large industrialists are not against reformations; industrialists and traders will continue to exhibit this supportive attitude until the increase of their national income rate will be suspended as a part of "social welfare state" process. Despite earning from the national income more than their proportion in the population today, since they expect that they will gain more in the future, self-employed persons are in favor of the change. If inflation will not make diminishing effects on their income rates, higher and lower rank bureaucrats will remain apathetic against the change. And because they hope to increase their income shares, technicians also affirm the change. Despite gaining less national income share than their proportion in the population, the small traders and craftsmen are reactionary against the change. Because they fear that their share will be even less in the future. Qualified and unqualified workers are, naturally, in favor of the change. Even if processes of increasing industrialisation and development are suspended for a while, unions that will progressively gain strength will provide these classes to obtain higher rates from the national income. Small farmers and agricultural laborers will not be able to define a certain reaction towards the change. If cooperative organisations and agricultural unionisation will develop considerably, they are expected to be in favor of the change. Landlords and big farm owners will naturally act against the change.

Tendencies of Turkish society will be determined according to impact degrees of these classes upon the political authority. In other words, chances of participating in and directing the political power for classes who are either in favor of reformation or not, will be the main factor that determines the future development course of the society.

Quite naturally of course, attitudes of various social classes and groups cannot be considered merely as directly related to their economical expectations. As their demand of being close to or participating in the political power defines the attitudes of these classes towards changing, acting organised or not, also constitutes a certain factor in this case.

"Democratisation" trends that will become intensified with "more participation" process, will increase the impacts of masses upon the politics. This will probably also affect the attitudes of some groups towards reformation.

Another important issue to be mentioned here is that the effort of the population who live in squatters areas "completely out of city dwelling principles" and who are transverse to all the groups and social classes mentioned above, to dominate over the cities and consequently the politics. The predatory acts of this population will affect many issues of Turkey in the 21st century.

Besides, it must be remembered that the big capitalists will try to delineate the society according to their own economical and ideological direction by owning big mass communication means. *When this "directive" power of big capitalists is united with the predatory actions of those who live in "areas out of city dwelling principles", we can say that the reformation course of Turkey will be defined by these groups in the 21st century.*

By combining with these groups, political groups will seem to serve in spreading the "consuming culture" that already has prevailed the society, since this will provide them a new intern career and

more wealth.

The result that is deduced from all these analyses is; the "democratisation" period in which masses of people will exert their authority more and more into the politics and administration, will not necessarily lead the country to a more just income distribution and an increased economical productivity.

7.PECULIAR CHARACTERISTICS OF RANKED SOCIETY IN TURKEY

There are some peculiar characteristics of ranked society in Turkey which differentiate them from their similars in the West. *The first* characteristic is about the relation between the superstructure of the society and the infrastructure variations. Because of forced directives of state plans, superstructures of Turkey did not come out as consequences of social and economical developments. On the contrary, all institutions like the civil code, democracy, unionism, economical planning and judicial audit over the legislative body were all directly adopted from the West, in order to prepare a suitable background for capitalist developments. In other words, the relation between the factors that determined the infrastructure and the affiliated superstructural developments, a process that we observe in the West, happened completely in the opposite manner in Turkey. *Turkey adopted the institutions that actually came out as a result of capitalist developments in the West and tried to accomplish the capitalist developments by means of these institutions.*

The second peculiar characteristic of ranked society in Turkey is the dominant role of state over the social, economical and political lives. This role was inherited from the Ottomans, was strengthened by Ataturk's Revolution (War of Independence and Revolutions) and was institutionalised by the 1960 coup. The 1960 action has created some "state institutions" like the Constitutional Court, National Security Council, new Presidency, autonomous university and Turkish Radio and Television Company. Since 1970s, after abandoning to follow an "etatist-elitist" direction, Republican People's Party (CHP) has adopted more clearly the duty of protecting the order of these "state institutions".

The duty of "state institutions" is closely related to the developments of classes in Turkey. Their role in the first years of the Republic was to create a strong capitalist class. Later, the capitalist class emerged as a significant social power and in 1950 this class took over the political power from the bureaucrats. So, bureaucrats who had lost anymore their power upon the political and administrative structure of the country, created new "state institutions" by the 1960 coup. The initial purpose of these institutions was to assist the working class to get organised around the principles of "social welfare state". Thus, a social balance was tried to be formed by means of spreading the use of fundamental rights and freedoms, against the extravagantly growing capitalist exploitation.

By the 1982 Constitution, either the power of these "state institutions" have been weakened or their autonomy was restricted. This was the expected result of the "murdering madness" period that gripped the whole Turkey between 1970 and 1980. Approaching to the matter with this thought; "seeing that these institutions could not terminate this madness, therefore it means that they did not perform their duties properly", the 1982 Constitution changed the functions of these institutions by strengthening another state institution, the Presidency.

The Ozal Government that came into power straight after the military regime, adopted a policy which provide the big capitalists a state support and sped up the capitalisation process in Turkey. This period during which the "social welfare state" principle was neglected and uncontrolled

exploitation was encouraged, caused both a serious crisis of "values system" and defined a reformation in which even actions braking the rules of the "state of law" were institutionilised.

The two characteristics we briefly explained above, together formed some special features of Turkish social and political life. Those features can be summarised as below:

CONTRADICTIONS OF FORM AND CONTENT

The first peculiar feature is the contradictions observed between the formations of superstructures of Turkey and their contents. Since these institutions did not come out as natural consequences of interactions and clashes between social classes and groups within the frame of social and economical developments, they emerged together with contradictions between their forms and intimate features. Democracy is the best example of this. It is alleged that democracy in Turkey is criticised for not presenting real social and economical options to voters and it is only a "shell" without a "meaningful essence". They claim that because of the restrictions applied to various leftist groups and organisations and because there is not sufficient number of diverse leftist parties among the political parties. This type of criticisms will naturally continue unless concerned restrictions are abolished. Unfortunately however, the murder networks also used the same reasons before 1980. Whereas, what really needed to be criticised is the insufficiency of democracy in protecting itself from terrorism.

At the beginning of the 21st century, four other problems seem to appear before democracy. First of these is the problem of human rights in general manner. Especially the reality of PKK terror causes a completely opposite impact to the democratic regime which is normally supposed to overcome such problems by improving fundamental rights and freedoms.

The second problem in front of democracy is the weakness of preventing the democratical rights and freedoms to be used for restricting again the democratical rights and freedoms. Against both fundamentalist trends and other terrorist actions triggered by PKK, neither the democratical rights and freedoms were satisfactorily protected nor their misuse was prevented. Closing the Refah Party at the beginning of 1998 was a step taken within this frame of action which unfortunately did not mean anything more than a temporary measure.

The third problem that encounters democracy is corruption and bribery. The system is not yet cleansed completely from corruption and bandits by using legal methods implied by the state of law.

The fourth problem that awaits a solution from democracy is the "representative democracy crisis" caused by the combination of "the plundering culture" that is formed by developing groups of people who live in squatters' areas, with the politics. The vicious-circle of political parties that turns around the leader-delegate circle and the mentioned culture that dominates over both the legislative body and the government will be one of the biggest problems of the country in the 21st century.

Another example is the unionisation in Turkey. Severe disputes about upon which ground the unionisation action should be based are still continued today. The problem is whether to defend the rights of workers by using the program of a political party or acting impartially, by forcing pressures upon all of the parties. Unionisation in Turkey has been developed not by the efforts of workers, but by the efforts of "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats who held the control of the state. That is why, even this still constitutes a problem. Solution of this problem will be found in time by various interactions of the working class itself. When the working class will reach a definite general approach by their own efforts, along with other problems, this problem will also be

resolved.

The last example about this issue can be given with regard to institutions like TRT (Turkish Radio-Television Company) and universities that were once autonomous. These institutions did not stimulatingly fight for their own autonomy. Because of this, they still do not know how to use and how to protect their own autonomies. Probably, as a consequence of this matter, the 1982 Constitution abolished completely the autonomy of these institutions.

Although private television companies and private universities that were started to be established in 1990s, have diminished the authority over the society of both state universities and TRT, still comprise a great impact to the social structure and social reformation. However, especially within the frame of the "degeneration of values" that was dominant in the society especially during Ozal government, these private institutions also were depicting a helpless attitude swaying in the wave of "uncontrolled capitalist exploitation".

PROBLEM OF UNAWARENESS

The second peculiar characteristic of ranked society of Turkey again emerged out of the contradictions occurred between country's superstructure and substructure. Since the directions of superstructure surpassed the developments in the substructure and since some institutions are established as orders from the big gun, the "awareness" of concerned groups and classes did not get decently matured. As many examples also show, these groups and classes neither adhered to nor defended the institutions that were established for their own sake. Because, these groups and classes could not achieve an adequate experience that is obtained naturally after some social and economical events. That is why voters were always blamed not knowing their own "real interests" and who to give their votes. The same type of blame were directed towards the workers who do not know "the real interests of working class" and because of this, are hesitant about in what direction to use the unionisation. This situation originated two factual results. The first result is for nearly everyone trying to instill ideas and conscious to one group or class. Quite naturally this instillments have been in direction of however one person sees the "real interests" of one class. As the second result, many people relied merely upon "conscious making" education to solve Turkey's problems. Education, according to these people, is the only and the most effective mean to solve all problems including the economical development. In Turkey, the state's historical duty of "instilling official ideology" is reinforcing the two results.

Through Imam-Hatip schools (secondary schools training Islamic religious personnel), the issue of conscious making education was used in the best way by the "political Islam" against the ideological conflicts within the leftists and the "normal" education that was becoming more and more inefficient after 1950s and created a wide ground for themselves in Turkey, a country at the entrance of the 21st century.

ABSENCE OF TOLERANCE AGAINST DISPUTES

The third peculiarity of ranked class of Turkey originated from the same conflict between the infrastructure and superstructure and the severe control of state over the social, economical and political life. This peculiarity is the intolerance that is observed in the conflicts between various interest groups and classes. As a result of this intolerance, use of peaceful solutions for solving the conflicts of interests has been very rare. There are two causes behind this situation. The first cause is for the society not being accustomed to severe interest clashes of different groups and classes, since the state controlled by the "etatist-elistist" bureaucrats had always suppressed all types of

conflicts. Because of this, any group or class who try to defend their rights are straight-away blamed for being opportunist self-seekers or even worse, for "endangering the national unity". The danger of this way of commenting is obvious: If interest groups or classes are prevented from defending explicitly their interests, it is inevitable for social, economical or political explosions to take place in the society. Besides, interest groups and classes who think that they will be blamed anyway for "endangering the national unity", will exhibit more negative and violent methods for defending their interests. The second cause for this situation is the use of peaceful solutions (like the parliamentary democracy and collective bargaining) not to be appropriated by the society since they have always been imposed from the upper administrative ranks towards lower ranks. These two main causes together created a general "intolerant" attitude within the society. This "absence of tolerance" is not a concept related to personal characteristics or general spiritual attributes of Turkish people. It is only a result of not being used to the interest conflicts and not having adequate experience in using peaceful solutions for such disputes of interests.

In my opinion, this "absence of tolerance" takes up a very important part among "the reasons of violent actions" that I previously mentioned.

The absence of tolerance that initiated the violence before 1980, caused both start of PKK terror and use of violence for political Islamists. Thus, apart from having undeveloped democratical institutions, the sudden emergence of individual issues like religion and race in politics, the intolerance joined with political inexperience which formed a situation that became one of the structural elements of our political life.

STATE TRADITION OF IDEOLOGICAL INSTILLING

The forth peculiarity of Turkish people is closely related to the state's duty of "instilling ideology" into the society. The Western practice is taken as the model for Turkey's social, economical and political development. However, there have been different development stages for various institutions of the West (Ilhan, 1972). Because of this, everybody comments differently upon the West and try to form the Turkish public in the way they perceive the "West". The same is also applied to leftist trends. Generally they discuss about the models in foreign countries, generated by foreigners. Existence of different leftist models in the West (Ilhan, 1970), drifted the debates towards the issue of which model to be chosen. This may bring very dangerous consequences for political groups who are still debating over this subject and meanwhile using an "etatist-elitist" approach. Because of their way approaching the issue, these groups think only around the frame of classical models of either pure capitalism, or Orthodox Marxism. Thus, they most likely fall either on the side of one classical model or on the opposing side of this. Continuation of mimicking the "Western models" will cause etatist-elitist groups to become more alienated from the society. Besides, this situation will hinder the production efforts of rational solutions suiting to Turkish social, economical and political structure.

On the other hand, traditional role of the state to transfer and instill foreign institutions into the society also causes the "etatist-elitist" approaches to carry on. Some groups are adopting to themselves roles as "protectors of the state institutions" or "social engineers" who actually exert pressures upon the society to control them.

As a last point on this subject, we should mention that analyses we made above about the peculiar characteristics of Turkish public were conducted by considering the past experiences. In other words, these characteristics emerge from historical realities and from the developments lived in the Turkish society in the past. However, since the society continue to change rapidly, these

characteristics may also change in the near future. When social and economical reforms and developments will be followed by the commands of the superstructural institutions, the characteristics that are explained above will also change. Significant developments in the ranking structure of the society show that already a reformation tending towards this consequence initiated. Even though the future is formed greatly according to the past, the most important factor that will define the future will be no doubt the interactions between the working class and the big bourgeoisie. Namely, peculiar characteristics of today's Turkish society and clashes between classes will determine the direction and the structure of reformation that will be observed in the future. Actually, since the foundation of the Republic, developments in the society, especially the formations of classes, had initiated the qualitative changes in the state structure (Emrealp, 1984:184).

In this respect, we can state that the biggest power that will give shape to the society will be the big bourgeoisie who will also own the mass communication means. Quite naturally, this dominion of big bourgeoisie will be shared by the "state". As long as the problems of PKK terror, ambitions of establishing "sharia law" and corruption within the politics will continue, military bureaucracy also will participate within this partnership.

8.THE PLACE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY IN THE SOCIAL CHANGING PROCESS OF TURKEY

Historically, nearly all attempts of modernisation in the Ottoman Empire were either initiated by the army or were applied within the army. There were two reasons for this: *The first* reason was that the army was comprising an important part within the administrative central bureaucracy. *The second* reason was that the Ottoman army's loss of power before Europe's strong army was being perceived as the only cause for the social and economical collapse of the empire. As a result of these two reasons, most of the Westernisation trends were undertaken by the army in a political manner. The activities of the army emerged as struggles against the Sultan at the beginning of the 20th century.

IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY FORCES

Although the army had played a political role for a long time in the Ottoman Empire, it gained today's position mainly between 1908 and Ataturk's Revolution. In order to comprehend the position of the army in the Turkish political life, we should recall features formed in that period of time as below:

Firstly, Westernisation efforts started and developed within the frame of a constitutional action. This constitutionalist action caused emergence of a "legitimacy" need. In other words, soldiers who meddled in politics in the name of constitutionalism, against the restrictions of the Sultan, used the concept of "legitimacy" as justification for their actions.

Secondly, it should be remembered that the main objective of soldiers interfering in the politics was "Westernisation". For holding a target of creating a Western type society had been a ground for soldiers meddling into politics. Because of this, the military bureaucracy believed in and attached to the "Western model" politically and socially.

Thirdly, the army also wanted to change the religious-traditional Ottoman social structure as a reaction to the oppression of the Sultan. Therefore, one of the important characteristics of soldiers'

interference in the politics was "secularity".

Fourthly, since the concepts like "constitutionalism", "Westernisation" and "secularity" were completely deprived of social support, military bureaucracy exerted political power from the top towards the society to perform the revolutions. This despotic approach caused the common people to recede more from the state. Thus, not having any public support and being defined by despotic applications appears as another feature of military actions.

Ataturk Revolution has been the bridge between the role of military bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire and its role in the Republic of Turkey. As already known, Ataturk Revolution started as a military action because of the War of Independence. Later, when the Republic was founded, Ataturk has removed the military effects from the political order. Because, he knew that only from the military, a very strong counter-action would come. And as he had expected, after some of his old soldier friends were forced to resign from the army, then they established Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırka (Republican Progressive Party) for the purpose of representing the opposite ideas. However Ataturk put this attempt straight-away down by force.

Since both Ataturk and Ismet Inonu were the leaders of the War of Independence, did not have any difficulty in keeping the military bureaucracy under the control of the civilian bureaucracy that was represented by them. Thus, together with Republican People's Party, the domination of civil bureaucracy over political events has comprised a significant part of the "etatist-elitist" front. After the establishment of the Republic, military bureaucracy have been the defender of four principles. Westernisation, revolutionism, secularism and constitutionalism formed the main ideology of the Military Forces. (Here, we should mention that "West" was perceived selectively and for example, although it is a product of West, Marxism was omitted.)

In respect to the principles of "Westernisation" and "constitutionalism", the 1950 election after which the Democrat Party came into power, was evaluated positively by the army, whereas it was evaluated as negative in respect to "secularism" and "revolutionism" principles. Because, despite being came into power through legally held elections by defending a more intense cooperation with the West, being on a "traditional-liberal" front, it was being supported mainly by the traditionalist and fundamentalist groups.

Since historically, the Military Forces have always taken place on the "etatist-elitist" front, as soon as formed their government, the Democrat Party put the army under their control by conducting some crucial appointments and transfers in the army. Hence, the domination of civil bureaucracy was continued.

Democrat Party was not satisfactorily respectful towards the basic principles of democracy. Moreover, they could not catch up with or even neglected the social and economical reformations towards a "social welfare state" which occurred both in Turkey and in the West. This type of attitude was perceived by the army as a rivalry against the principles of "Westernisation" and "Constitutionalism" and this encouraged the army to interfere with the politics.

Another factor that set the army into action was the efforts of Democrat Party to put the "political Islam", a traditional structure of Ottoman Empire, into the operating mechanism of newly established nation-state.

During the rule of Menderes (Prime Minister and head of Democrat Party), Republican People's Party announced a "declaration of first targets", showing the general lines leading back to democracy.

Factually, all the "reformations" actualised by the Milli Birlik Komitesi (Committee for National

Unity) after the 1960 coup were involving all suggestions presented by the Republican People's Party. Thus, the 1960 coup was the product of the "etatist-elitist" front who targeted to establish the superstructural institutes of the "social welfare state".

The principle of "constitutionalism" played the major role for the army to take over the political power on the 27 May and leave the politics as soon as the new Constitution is prepared and approved by the public. On the other hand, two coup attempts of Talat Aydemir were not supported, because they were not regarded as "legal" by the rest of the Military Force. During the attempts of Talat Aydemir, the principles of "Westernisation" and "secularism" were not under danger, either. Because of this, the Military Forces did not perceived the intervention to the political power as necessary just in the name of the single principle of "revolutionism".

In respect of class relations, the 1960 coup was conducted against a capitalist exploitation which was developing in an uncontrolled way. Since, being the head actor, bourgeoisie had established a dominion over the parliament, the coup brought some new institutions and new ways of controlling the parliament under the forms of widespread democratical rights and freedoms. These controls were being led towards the creation of a "social welfare state". As the "social welfare state" is the only order in which the private sector can survive, the 1960 coup can be considered as an action conducted to protect the mixed economy system tend towards capitalism. Since a strong working class is an indispensable part of such an order, after the coup, improving measures for the rights of the working class were taken. That is, the coup was the action of the "etatist-elitist" group in reshaping the society complying with the Western model.

COUPS OF 1971 AND 1980

Relating to the role of Military Forces in the political arena, two major events happened during the period between 1960 and 1970. The first event was the class differentiation to be more effective in the Turkish political life (Sencer, Muzaffer, 1974:93). The second event is the dispersion of the "etatist-elitist" front which also formed by an important part of the Military Forces. When the Republican People's Party, the presenter of this front, left the "etatist-elitist" approach and adopted a leftist and populist attitude (Ecevit, 1974a), this front dissipated.

At the end of these developments, the military action which broke out in March 1971 could not find its old background within the "etatist-elitist" front and fall into a situation of defending the interests of capitalist class. After the warning that was sent to the government on the 12 March, the "traditionalist-liberals" started to control the situation on behalf of the capitalist class. As a result, all groups with strong political tendencies and many intellectuals were put through a torment (Selcuk, 1993). At the same time, the 1961 Constitution was also changed and fundamental rights and freedoms were restricted.

Undoubtedly, such a result was not foreseen by the Military Forces. Because, there was not any organic bound between the capitalist class and the Military Forces. The relation between the Military Forces and the bourgeoisie was ideological which was based upon the principle of "Westernisation" within the frame of Ataturk's Revolution. Because of this, the army did not interfere in the 1973 elections which were held on time and peacefully. Military Forces also acted respectfully towards the results of the elections. So, the leftist Republican People's Party formed a coalition government together with the Islamist National Salvation Party to come into power.

While the country was leading fast towards a civil war, Military Forces took over the government once more in 1980.

This time, being more experienced, the political, social, economical and legal regulations were conducted more comprehensively and more permanent. Both the "direct regulation" period and the "transition" period were kept more "controlled" and "longer".

Actually the coup of 12 September 1980 was the continuation of the coup of 12 March. Being one of those who were tormented, İlhan Selçuk also expressed that the foundation of 12 September was laid on 12 March (Selçuk, 1993:9). As time elapsed, military action dealers became more experienced and became more merciless. For example, Çalışlar compares the ages of imprisoned detainees and finds that the average of prisoners on 12th March were university students, whereas the average of prisoners on 12th September were students of high schools (Çalışlar, 1989:80).

The cooperation among the big capitalist groups that first appeared on 12 March has gained a structural feature on 12 September.

So the Military Forces depicted a picture which has never been seen in the traditional ideology of the army and moreover, during the voting of the constitution, the army forced, in the same way, Evren to be chosen as President and contradicted the principle of "legitimacy" by not allowing the free debating opportunity during the propaganda times of parties.

The Constitution was put to vote under so much pressure that for saying "I will say 'no' to this Constitution", famous writer Oktay Akbal was imprisoned, for the ground of making opposite propaganda.

During the military regime many newspapers were closed as a result of restricting measures suppressed upon the media. For example, Hurriyet newspaper's publication of a research conducted about results of the elections was terminated at the last minute (Sucu, 1995:100-103).

Anyhow, the 1980 coup was completely different than previous coups. There were two main characteristics that differ it from the other coups.

Firstly, the military regime of 1980 completely used a religious dialect. Hence, formed a suitable ground for Political Islamists to gain a state support. Since they cut all their support channels by closing all political parties and labor organisations and democratical institutions and confronting the universities and intellectuals, the soldiers started to seek the social and political support from the religious feelings of the society.

Secondly, the 1980 coup was explicitly in cooperation with big capitalist groups. The economical policy has been determined completely in line with the interests of these groups.

As another feature in this respect, the military regime followed the same tradition of the previous coups of acting in full accordance with the United States of America.

The first two characteristics peculiar to this coup and the third characteristic were all combined in one personality:

Turgut Özal, both being the strong man of the military regime, and the political leader of the following administrative term, used all these three characteristics with an extraordinary courage in order to reshape the Turkish society.

Thus, the contradiction between the "secularity" principle of the traditional military bureaucracy and "reliance upon the political Islam" which is one of the characteristics of 12th September action, was now more clear.

Interestingly, both the great changes and the unconstitutional practices that Ozal performed with the support of the army constituted examples also for Ciller.

After the death of Ozal, Ciller has become the General chairman of the DYP (The Party of Right Path) and the Prime Minister and based her governmental strategy upon the supports of the army. Being obtained the great support of the Head of the General Staff, Ciller unconcerned attempts that would lead her owning farms and real properties in the USA on one hand, and on the other scandals like the concealed subsidy and Susurluk.

In reality, the military bureaucracy was not seem to be so much concerned about all these events.

However, whenever Ciller, despite of all her election campaigns, completely changed her attitude and set a coalition together with the Welfare Party, a party which Ciller herself announced it as the greatest danger. Thus herself and Erbakan, the leader of Welfare Party, came into power. Whereas, Welfare Party, as if attained the whole support from the public, started to plan how to change the regime. Then, the soldiers realised how close the threat of fundamentalist approach of "political Islam" was.

Apart from the "secularity" and "legitimacy" principles of the army that were being damaged since the Ozal government, now the principle of "Westernisation" was also under danger.

28th FEBRUARY 1997 AND AFTERWARDS

The most important side of the 28th February intervention was that this intervention was performed after a two months of public reaction.

Despite being started as a "public action" conducted for clarifying the Susurluk Scandal, the action of "one minute darkness for continual brightness" has become a protest against the "sharia law desires" that were encouraged by the Refahyol coalition with the slogans shouted as "Turkey is secular and will remain secular!".

Realising the reactions of the public, the army "legitimately" interfered the government through the National Security Council, a constitutional institute that was founded for providing the dialogue between the political government and the Military Forces.

This intervention was carried out by some suggestions presented by the National Security Council and all of these suggestions to be accepted by the Council. In other words, Erbakan, the Prime Minister of the time, and Ciller, the Deputy Prime Minister, agreed that these decisions about the fundamentalism becoming a close threat and eight years of compulsory education needed to be applied in the shortest time. Hence, the Council under the chairmanship of the President, accepted the suggestions of the military front and proposed to solve the problems within the constitutional limits.

The process started in February, continued by the briefings of the Military Forces given to various sections of the government. In these briefings, adjudicatory organs, media and high-level bureaucrats were being warned the danger and closeness of fundamentalism.

Mass communication companies that were completely under the control of big capitalists anymore, also supported this campaign. However, the legitimate solution could only be achieved through the attitude of the parliament.

All these struggles caused a change of roles between the political partners. So, Erbakan resigned from the position of Prime Ministry and submitted to the President Demirel, the signatures of Parliament Members declaring that they will continue to support the Government under the Prime Ministry of Ciller.

Demirel, however, did not show any consideration to this message and constitutionally gave the duty of forming the new government to Mesut Yılmaz.

The process of 28th February did not turn into a coup d'etat, not only because of "one minute darkness for continual brightness" action and social support gained by the military briefings, but also because of the lack of foresight of Erbakan-Ciller couple and the contribution of some parliament members in overthrowing the Refahiyol government.

In the changing of the government through "normal ways" and for the event to be kept within the legitimate boundaries of the Constitution, there are great contributions of media controlled by the big capitalists and President Demirel who convinced the parliament members.

Since the problem was chosen within the Parliament, the 28th February intervention exerted effects which were much less damaging and much more lasting.

Just as, the practice of eight years compulsory education played a major role in blocking the spreading of Imam-Hatip schools.

Moreover, after the 28th February, that is before the overthrowing of Welfare-Right Path Coalition, the suit against the Welfare Party demanding its closure which was first brought to court on the 21st May 1997 by the Attorney General, came to a conclusion on the 16th January 1998 and thus Welfare Party has been closed the third time in its political history.

Another important development caused by the 28th February was that the politics of Turkey in the 21st century would be determined by the big capitalists who own mass communication means and the military bureaucracy which played a major role struggling against the PKK terror and fundamentalist danger.

As long as the threat of PKK and desires for sharia order continues, the army will seem to be always interfere with the politics.

The possession of the media, that is the mass communication means, by the big capitalists is a natural economical development which seems to be situation return of which is impossible.

Because of these reasons, we can easily say that the 21st century's Turkey will be shaped by these two major powers.

POSITION OF THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY

The role of the civilian bureaucracy to "save the state" during the Ottoman Empire, continued as the role of "creating a new nation" during the Republic (Heper, 1971). Since the efforts of creating a new nation were conducted corresponding the Western model, to create a national bourgeoisie has become a purpose also for the civilian bureaucracy. Whereas, while bureaucracy appeared as the result of the development of bourgeoisie in the West, on the contrary, the civilian bureaucracy in Turkey took over a heavy duty of creating a capitalist class. That is why, unlike those in the

West, the civilian bureaucracy in Turkey could not absorb fully the value standards of a capitalist society.

In respect to this, since the values were transferred from the West, the bureaucracy of the Republic term also attained a political entity needed for establishing secular, centralist nation-state (Heper, 1974:8-20). Actually, the role of the bureaucracy in the social reformation of Turkey was emerged from the governments being the initiator every reform (Chambers, 1970:327).

During the Ataturk's Revolution, under the rule of Republican People's Party, the bureaucracy was identified with the political elitists of the country. Thus, the Revolutions of Ataturk were being instilled into the society by the "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats. Later, when the core of the capitalist class was formed, as a result of the development of state capitalism, some parts of the bureaucracy started to combine together with the bourgeoisie. At this point, the "traditionalist-liberal" parts began to separate from the "etatist-elitist" part.

On the other hand, the "etatist-elitist" part within the bureaucracy continued to feel privileged amongst the other independent classes of the society, and because of this they were not appropriating to combine with the developing capitalist class for themselves. Despite of major capitalist developments were realised during his Presidency, Ismet Inonu has been the leader of this administrative group who conserved their "etatist-elitist" way of approach.

After 1950, the Democrat Party rule kept also the control of the civilian bureaucracy and used it as a strong weapon in strengthening the capitalism. Therefore, both the "etatist-elitist" period, and the "traditionalist-liberal" period were symbolized by a bureaucracy assisting the development of the capitalism. This assistance was ideological in the beginning. Later however, when the bourgeoisie fully appeared, it turned to a economical and financial cooperation. Thus, during the rule of Democrat Party, the "traditionalist-liberal" elements of the bureaucracy has continued cooperation with the capitalist class more effectively.

Meanwhile, one part of the "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats who reserved immune against the bourgeoisie, started to criticize bitterly the cooperation between the bourgeoisie and some parts of bureaucracy. These critiques later formed the opposition ideas of Republican People's Party against the Democrat Party. Actually this opposition itself was subject to criticism. Because, during the single party rule, supporting bourgeoisie with the bureaucracy was their own policy. Still, this opposition triggered the military bureaucracy and caused the 1960 coup.

Undoubtedly, during the rule of the Democrat Party, rapidly growing inflation which decreased the share of the bureaucracy in the national income, has been another cause for the 1960 coup. That is why, financial and legal measures that strengthen the bureaucracy against the political power, were taken in the 1961 Constitution. The ideological beliefs of "social welfare state" and group interests of the bureaucracy were in complete compliance with the 1960 coup.

Because of the leading role of the bureaucracy in Turkey, within the society this class was sometimes regarded as the balancing force opposite of the bourgeoisie. The main mistake of this type of approach was giving independent roles to bureaucracy opposing the other classes of the society which was situation appeared automatically after historical events peculiar to the Ottoman-Turkish societies. But what was being forgotten here, within the development line of the Ottoman-Turkish societies, the bureaucracy always obtained an administrating role only in the absence of the bourgeoisie. As soon as the bourgeoisie was developed, some parts of bureaucracy has been straight-away combined with the bourgeoisie. Since it does not bear a feature of being a social and economical class itself, it is very natural for the bureaucracy to unite with the strongest class in the society that exerts power upon the political rule. The best example of this is the DPT (State Institute of Planning). Being established after the 1960 coup to increase technocratic and

bureaucratical investigations over governments, the DPT only a short time later, itself was subject to the investigation of the governments. When considered from this point, it is not a surprise that DPT was regarded negatively by the bureaucrats, whereas positively by the private enterprisers (Şaylan, 1974:145).

On the other hand, the Ottoman tradition was still effective amongst some of the "etatist-elitist" groups. Many of the "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats were sad about loosing their impact in the society and were uneasy about being controlled by the bourgeoisie. That is why, many of them were longing for the days of the single party rule when the bureaucracy was the strongest power in administration (Saylan, 1974:177-179).

For the bureaucracy to fall under the rule of the bourgeoisie, a class which grown with the assistance of the bureaucracy has attracted some reactions. Because of this, in 1960s and 1970s, some parts of bureaucracy formed themselves according to the capitalist values, whereas some other parts grown reaction against that and adopted a severely revolutionist attitude (Saylan, 1974:215). An important part of the bureaucrats perceive that their interests are in line with those of workers (Bozkurt, O., 1980:181).. In reality, in parallel to the class developments within the society, bureaucracy also divided among itself "traditionalist-liberal" and "etatist-elitist" fronts.

As a consequences of social and political occurrences these fronts dissolved and this division in the bureaucracy was disappeared, but for a while a leftist and rightist parting appeared. These political and ideological partings were reflected mostly on the police force as the leftist Pol-Der and rightist Pol-Bir.

Being terminated by the 1980 coup, this type parting continued structuring in two dimensions after 1980s.

The first occurrence is the occupation of some state positions by "nationalist-Islamist" groups resulted a division of civil servants tied to political Islam and those who are not.

As the second occurrence, dominance of political parties over the civil servants spread especially during the rule of Ozal as gangs using all means leading to corruption and bribery. This occurrence caused some important events to break out during Ciller's rule.

The event below which is narrated by Hasan Pular, reflects the bureaucracy-politician relations concentrated more upon bribery and corruption which later will lead to ganging:

"A holding company owner demands 35 million Marks and 122 billion TL credit in December 1990 for building 5 thousand apartments in Ukraine.

"Emlak Bank, regarding a writing from the Toplu Konut Başkanlığı (Housing Development) as guarantee, granted this company the 122 billion TL...

"To cut it short the long story...

"Neither there are any construction carried out by this company in Ukraine, Odessa, nor there is any company called like this, of course there is no trace of 122 billion TL loaned by Emlak Bank. "Without clearing the hands of politicians from the KITs (State-owned Economic Enterprise) and state banks, neither privatisation, nor any amelioration can be possible..." (Pular, 1994:266)

This unification of the bureaucracy and politicians with the corruption and bribery continued increasingly during the Ciller's government. Consequently, some part of these relations became the current issue of the Parliament as Susurluk scandal. At the end of a report concerning this scandal, immunities of some politicians were canceled.

Both of these tendencies in the bureaucracy are not occurrences that came out in one night. They are the results of a series political developments. So it is not so easy to fight against them, either.

In addition to these trends, the civilian bureaucracy became very clumsy and unproductive. In other words, bureaucracy in Turkey has lost its ability of solving problems and instead itself became a big problem for the administrative system (Kongar, 1996a)..

One of the greatest problems of Turkey in the 21st century will be the reformation of the civilian bureaucracy including the judicial reform.

Quite naturally, the civilian bureaucracy has lost all its special characteristics. It only struggles to last by associating with those in the power. In this respect, the characteristic of being a "social and political power on its own" and orienting the society have become memories of the past.

Concluding the examination of the civilian bureaucracy, we must mention about two more important points. The first point is, the very close relation between the civilian and military bureaucracy is still exists. Because of this, characteristics of these two groups greatly affect each other. In this respect, we can state that civilian bureaucracy will largely be affected from the military bureaucracy which will be more active in the 21st century. The second point is, as the class structure of the society changes, fundamental attitudes and approaches of the bureaucracy will also change. We can expect that both civilian and military bureaucracy will change their attitudes if the working class will be more effective upon the social and economical structure and will bring more their power into the political events.

9.CONCEPTUALISATION OF REFORMATION OF TURKISH SOCIETY

Factors lying behind the reformation of Turkish society can be gathered in three groups as outside world, domestic developments (ideology and class formation) and impacts of individuals (though very little).

OUTSIDE WORLD

Defining effects of the events in the world upon the changing process of Turkish society occurred in two stages. The first stage begins with friendly relationship between Germany and Ottoman Empire which was initiated by the negative political and economical agitation of foreign countries. However, the unity with Germany dragged Ottoman Empire into the First World War. Invasion of Anatolia caused by the defeat, aroused a severe reaction both against the enemy and the Sultan together with the political system represented by him. The young Turkish Republic was established at the end of the Independence War which had been waged against the enemy and the monarchy system. As can be clearly seen, there is a direct relation between the Ottoman Empire to enter the control of foreign powers and the establishment of the Republic. The declaration of the Republic defines the end of the first stage of the outside world's effects upon the reformation of Turkish society.

The second stage starts in 1945 when Soviet Russia's imposed of their demands onto Turkey. Demands of Soviets compelled Turkey to seek a Western guarantee against this threat. The closeness between America and Turkey is the yield of this endeavor of Turkey.. This closeness rendered Turkey to politically and economically unite with the West through agreements and organisations like the Marshall Plan, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development) and European Customs Union.

Therefore, being one of the major definitive powers of the social, economical and political structure of Turkey, the Western impact, is the result of the threat posed by now collapsed Soviets Union in 1945. This unification with the West determines the second stage of the role of the outside world upon Turkey.

One of results of this unification is to be able to enter the Customs Union, after a long struggle and by earnest implores of both leftist and rightist political leaders, alas staying still outside of the European Union.

Disregarding all rational options and accepting to enter the Customs Union in 1995 which is a situation that Turkey has to submit its economy to decisions taken without Turkey's opinion or consent, is quite similar to Turkey's membership to NATO in 1950.

Just as happened 100 years ago, the West, this time with its EU entity, while behaving very reluctant to accept Turkey to enter this Union, itself however, entered into Turkey's market and started to use all its opportunities without having to pay any costs that it should have normally paid.

The reason I gave this example is the claims of a factual existence of an "imperialist exploitation". However, if there is such a thing really, then we should look for its origin inside our country, not outside of it.

Assuming that, in the 21st century, Turkey is approaching to be a central country from being a country (which every sign is showing this direction), the term "imperialist exploitation" itself will be a meaningless statement.

Even from this point of view, it is not a forgivable mistake to enter the Customs Union without obtaining any benefit from it.

Nevertheless, even this great fault will not seem to affect so much the general political and ideological direction, since Turkey already determined to be a "Western type nation-state" with its own free will.

The inexcusable side of this mistake however, emerges just from this point: Being already decided to take its place amongst the Western countries, Turkey would be able to reach the position of a "central" country only after reaching the economical wealth of other "central" countries. Being already poorer than EU countries, Turkey's entrance to the Customs Union without obtaining any benefit from it, will most likely cause Turkey to pay great amounts of costs during the adaptation term.

Many sectors will probably fall into difficulties due to the extemporaneous opening of customs ports and while imagining to approach to be a central country, Turkey may find itself again as one of those "" countries.

Moreover, there are two Pandora's boxes here: One is Cyprus, and the other is PKK.

Turkey seems to be left alone in both of these problems, especially against its neighbor Greece, within the relations of both United States and Western Europe.

We can claim that these two "national" problems, that is both PKK and Cyprus, will intensely affect the foreign relations of Turkey in the 21st century, however the real interaction will be the opposite and the "outside world" will turn their back and will cause Turkey to live very hard days.

INNER DYNAMICS AND IMPROVEMENT OF DEMOCRACY

Inner developments of Turkey can be divided into two stages. The first stage covers the period of Ottoman Empire, the second stage covers the nation-state period since the establishment of the Republic. Development of inner elements has been in a "dialectical" way. In other words, the interaction between opposite sides is the dominant form of Turkey's inner advancement.

Inner dynamics behind the establishment of Turkish Republic were generally ideological. Military and technical retardation of Ottoman Empire caused rising of reactions which are both Western advocator, and anti-Western. These reactions were Western advocator, because the "Western model" was adopted as the main direction of advancement due to the admittance of superiority of the West. However, they were anti-imperialist at the same time, because the political intervention and economical exploitation of the West were seen as the main causes of the collapse of Ottoman Empire.

The second stage of this advancement can be perceived as the interactions between opposite classes during the Republican time. The national capitalist class has been developed under the rule of bureaucrats. Later, the developed bourgeoisie came into power and the main collusion was happened in the relations between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. I use the bureaucracy term here to represent the only "etatist-elitist" part of bureaucrats, including the Republican People's Party and the term "bourgeoisie" represents the Democrat Party. The bureaucracy came into power again with the 1960 coup, however after the 1965 elections, the bourgeoisie was reelected by the people. The working class acceleratingly advanced their situation under the rule of bourgeoisie.

The social and economical conditions between 1950 and 1960 that caused the emergence of working class were strengthened by the legal measures taken by the bureaucracy between 1960 and 1965. In this respect, the working class actually a common yield of both the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy.

The dual role of the bureaucracy is more clear at this point. While some part of the bureaucracy combined together with the bourgeoisie, the other part acted as an independent administrative class against the bourgeoisie. In other words, the "traditionalist-liberal" elements within the bureaucracy collaborated with the capitalist class, whereas the "etatist-elitists" continued to act in a separate front.

The dual and contradicting characteristic of the bureaucracy comes from the aspects peculiar to Ottoman-Turkish social structure. Being created within the Ottoman-Turkish society as an independent class as a result of peculiar historical conditions, the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish society was not a real class, so it performed contradicting duties during its own development and at the end, it started to macerate among the more defined classes.

The "etatist-elitist" bureaucracy has not only been the creator of the bourgeoisie and the supporter of the working class, it has also acted as the presenter and the protector of the democracy.

Contradictions between the "etatist-elitist" front and the "traditionalist-liberal" front ended with the formation of capitalist and working classes. Although not having a definite class specifications, these four groups are seen as the main power origins that can directly affect the political, social and economical development of Turkey.

The first of these is the Turkish Military Forces, that is the military bureaucracy, who are the determiner of the "etatist-elitist" front. As a result of both the advanced inter-class relations of

political parties and the diminished power of the civilian bureaucracy and its direct collaboration with the political power, the military bureaucracy with its already separate identity, appeared as a freestanding power that acts in its own name.

The other power source was the "political Islam" which represents the traditional culture and trade relations coming historically from the Ottomans.

In the 1980 coup, the military bureaucracy collaborated with the USA in abroad and at home, with the well-developed capitalist class and developing political Islam. This collaboration, especially during Ozal's government, developed in a way threatening the social welfare state and the secularism.

Together with the perversive effects of the slandering culture of those who live "out of city dwelling principles", bribery and corruption in the political structure laid their hands on all political parties and hence all administrative system through the "representative system".

After a while, being developed and gained strength in the same process, the representative party of political Islam joined with DYP (The Right Path Party), the bourgeoisie party which was dissolved after 1980, and they together came into power.

Therefore, big capitalists have parted into two groups as those who want to protect the democratical system, and those liberals who would like change the democratical order with a more religion-oriented "sharia state".

This partition which also had economical aspects, appeared not because of inter-class relations and economical circumstances, but was the outcome of "ideological" repercussions.

Here, a very peculiar common-interclass unification appeared in Turkey:

Mass crowds of people, non-governmental organisations, big capitalists, all companies own mass communication means, the military bureaucracy, the Presidency, the opposition parties and some members of DYP started an action to protect the democracy. This vast alliance, quite naturally, has achieved an outcome in a short time, and the coalition government formed with parties one of which was said to be covering up the corruption and the other which explicitly showed its desire for regime other than democracy, was overthrown.

Thus, the formula of "army plus capital equals despotism" which mislead many intellectuals, has been proven not every time to be true and to be false for the structure peculiar to Turkey.

Before this, during the War of Independence, in 1950 when Democrat Party came into power, during the military coup of 1960 and even during the 1980 military coup, similar vast alliances were founded and nearly all of them yielded different results, because all of them were based on distinctly separate grounds.

Where would this observation lead us about the vision of Turkey in the 21st century?

The first result is the truth that the classical inter-class models are not always valid for the analysis of Turkey's structure and reformation process. In nearly every transformation there was a different type of alliances where sometimes the groups within the same class have rivaled against each other, whereas some other times, conflicting groups or classes could join together around some definite purposes and ideologies.

The second result is that Turkey will observe very different groups and classes like the military bureaucracy and political Islam that have their own peculiarities and whose identifications are very difficult, will be active and exist all together in one system in the 21st century.

The third result is that to attain the support or protect the interests of a group or class is not always necessary for the inter-class relations. The best example of this happened when Ciller, the representative of the big capitalists and an ally of the military bureaucracy, has formed a coalition with Erbakan, the leader of political Islam, she was left all alone by the groups and classes she seemed to be the representative of.

The fourth result is that, when any serious danger against the democratical and secular, social state of law is perceived, a massive and ideological alliance, involving all groups and classes, has been able to be formed.

There is a very significant meaning of all these results for Turkey in the 21st century: The big capitalists and the military bureaucracy, the two great orientating powers, will be able to play major constructive roles also for the protection and the improvement of the democratical characteristic of the regime. Of course the opposite is also possible due to the external and domestic conjuncture.

However, some activities performed by massive amount of people together with the big capitalists and the military bureaucracy, like the action of "one minute darkness for continuous brightness", inspire whole Turkey with hope.

Just as, the development of democracy in Turkey has been formed in a dialectical atmosphere. Every decision and action exhibited within the political life have encountered with a negative version and at the end, a kind of combination of different approaches was achieved.

When a party was supported by a class in the society, that party has been able to attain the political power, however if a party was deprived of such a support, it always failed. For the experiences of Terakkiperver Firka (Republican Progressive Party) and the following experiment of Serbest Firka (Liberal Party) have been unsuccessful during the rule of Ataturk, since (along with other reasons) they did not have a significant group support. The same applies to the successes of Democrat Party in 1950 and Justice Party (AP) in 1965. In both of these experiences bourgeoisie explicitly supported these parties. Because of this, CHP (the Republican People's Party) could only come into power in 1973 and 1978 with the support of the working class. On the other hand, the 1960 coup is an action conducted by the bureaucracy, a class which was still possessing its administrative influence. If the evolution stages of the "etatist-elitist" front and the "traditionalist-liberal" front, the two opposing fronts, are examined, the democratical formations of Turkey can be understood in a better way. The development of these two fronts is shown on Table (X) – (13) and Table (X) – (14).

TABLE (X) – (13)
DEVELOPMENT OF "ETATIST-ELITIST" FRONT

<i>PERIOD</i>	<i>REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRONT</i>	<i>CLASS SUPPORT</i>	<i>GENERAL APPROACH</i>
1 1865-1872	Young Ottomans	Some parts of the bureaucracy	Constitutionalism
2 1908-1918	Ittihad ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress)	Some parts of the bureaucracy and newly forming capitalists	Constitutionalism, centralism, Westernism, nationalism
3 1918-1923	Organisations of Defense of Law	Intermediate classes (tradesmen and small landowners) Some parts of the bureaucracy and newly forming capitalists	War against the enemy, opposition to imperialism
4 1920-1923	The first group in BMM (Great National Assembly)	intermediate classes (tradesmen and small landowners) Some parts of the bureaucracy and newly forming capitalists	Republicanism, Westernism, opposition to imperialism

<i>PERIOD</i>	<i>REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRONT</i>	<i>CLASS SUPPORT</i>	<i>GENERAL APPROACH</i>
5 1923-1950	Republican People's Party	Bureaucracy, intermediate classes (tradesmen and small landowners) and newly forming capitalists	Principles depicted with six arrows, supporting the Westernisation and bourgeoisie
6 1950-1960	Republican People's Party	Bureaucracy, some parts of the intermediate classes, some parts of working class	Democracy within an understanding of social welfare state
7 1960-1969	Republican People's Party	Bureaucracy, some parts of intermediate classes, some parts of industrial workers	Social and economical revolutions

TABLE (X) – (14)
DEVELOPMENT OF "TRADITIONALIST-LIBERAL" FRONT

<i>PERIOD</i>	<i>REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRONT</i>	<i>CLASS SUPPORT</i>	<i>GENERAL APPROACH</i>
1 1865-1872	The Sultan (Sultan-Caliph)	Some parts of the bureaucracy	Religionist, traditional oppressive groups
2 1908-1918	The Sultan and Freedom and Entente Cordiale	Some parts of the bureaucracy and newly forming capitalists	Religionist, traditional oppressive groups
3 1918-1923	The Sultan and the Istanbul government	Some parts of the bureaucracy and newly forming capitalists	Seeking refuge in the condolence of enemy
4 1920-1923	The second group in BMM (Great National Assembly)	Intermediate classes, Some parts of the bureaucracy	Traditionalism, protection of the Sultanate and Khilafa
5 1923-1950	Terakkiperver Firka (Republican Progressive Party)	Intermediate classes, common people and newly forming capitalists	Liberalism in the economy and politics

<i>PERIOD</i>	<i>REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRONT</i>	<i>CLASS SUPPORT</i>	<i>GENERAL APPROACH</i>
	Serbest Firka (Liberal Party)	capitalists	
6 1950-1960	Democrat Party	Bourgeoisie, intermediate classes, small tradesmen and villagers	Uncontrolled capitalist exploitation
7 1960-1969	Party of Justice (Adalet Partisi)	Bourgeoisie, some parts of the bureaucracy, some parts of villagers	Continuation of uncontrolled capitalist exploitation

As can be seen in the Tables, the political life in Ottoman period was deprived of meaningful class variations. Contradictions were occurring generally upon the ideological approaches. During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal collaborated with "intermediate classes" (traders and small landowners) against the Sultan and his bureaucracy. These intermediate classes (including the big landlords) were very happy to work together with Mustafa Kemal. Because he was representing the power of the central bureaucracy for them. Therefore, the "etatist-elitist" front was established between the Republican bureaucracy and the "intermediate classes" during the first years of the Republic in order to form a national bourgeoisie. In this respect, the surrounding groups were first time uniting with the central power.

Beginning from 1950s, a more obvious class divisions started to appear in the society. After 1960, the "etatist-elitist" front started to dissolve. Because, the superstructural institutions were fully formed without needing the support of the public and the struggle for creating a Western type society has finished. Beginning from 1965, the class structure similar to that of the West, has always been under the rule of the politics which was still carrying the traditional characteristics peculiar to Turkey. Another reason for the "etatist-elitist" front to dissolve was the bureaucratic structure to start changing as a result of the inter-class developments of the society. After 1965, the "etatist-elitist" bureaucracy lost its class specifications which were related to its role as an administrating class.

Thus, the Republican People's Party, instead of adopting an "elitist" approach, started to apply "publican" ideology and consequently, the conflict between the "etatist-elitist" front and the "traditionalist-liberal" front ended. That is the reason why the Tables (X) – (13) and Table (X) – (14) finish in 1969. Since 1923 as a result of all events in the society, the main interest struggle within the society shifted towards the relations between groups related to the working class and the groups related to the bourgeoisie. Although seemingly the bourgeoisie supporters were dominant, groups identified themselves with the working class were also rapidly improving. Meanwhile, instead of the "etatist-elitist" front, a weak "publican-leftist" front was emerging, and the "traditionalist-liberal" front reacted to this as establishing a "nationalist front" (Kongar, 1975b).

Within this process, the coup on the 12th September 1980 was the result of illegal violent and terrorist actions and "regime conflicts" occurred due to the lack of foresight of leaders of political parties of the time. That is, the 1980 coup was nothing to do with the natural development process of inter-class changes.

The leftist murder rings who call themselves "revolutionists" and the rightist murder gangs who call themselves "idealists" turned the country into a crime arena which is very suitable for a violent

military coup.

The responsible agents of 12th September coup had to take one side amongst the classes in the country where there was no serious "etatist-elitist" front, and the "traditionalist-liberal" front changed its characteristic features. So the military regime reached the massive crowds of people via their religious feelings.

Actually, if the class development would have completed and all democratical institutions would be properly settled, this model would lead Turkey to stabilisation, however because of three reasons, it caused new problems and consequently, new crises.

Firstly, the democratical rights and freedom were restricted and the historical and socio-economical development pace of the democracy was terminated. This was itself a cause for a crisis.

Secondly, with the support granted to the political Islam, ambitions of "sharia order" were amplified and hence a new regime crisis was on its way.

Thirdly, during the Ozal's government, the antidemocratic features of the regime was strengthened and the bribery and corruption were allowed and a medium for degeneration of social values emerged.

These outcomes caused two diverse political parties, DYP, a conservative party used social democrat slogans during the 1991 elections, and SHP (Socialist Activity Party) with a social democrat characteristic, to form a coalition government.

Meanwhile, both the development of political Islam continued, and after the death of Ozal, Demirel became the President and his leading position in the Right Path Party (DYP) was occupied by Tansu Ciller. Then, the previous problems started to reappear again.

In this atmosphere, exhibiting a completely opposite approach to their propaganda in 1995 elections, Erbakan and Ciller formed a coalition government and instead of performing productive works in the government, they started to express openly the terms of political Islam and covered up the corruption reports belonging to Ciller's term. This of course caused a regime crisis to surface.

Whereas, the big capitalists who owned the mass communication means and so hold the power of influencing the society, were very restless about both the desires of political Islamists and the claims of corruption and bribery.

Another time in the democratical history of Turkey, civilian politicians caused the formation of a ground for the military intervention.

Upon this, the 28th February 1997 warning resulted a new coalition government to be formed between three parties; ANAP-DSP-DTP. As a consequence of this intervention, the Welfare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court.

In this respect, unless an unexpected international crisis or a surprise national event break out, we can state these expectations for the democratical development pace of the future:

Principally, we can say that the democratisation process, conforming to all contemporary models

with its institutions and rules, will continue in the 21st century, too.

During this process, the big capitalists, not only with their economical power, but also through the mass communication means that they own, will play more effective roles.

As long as the threat of PKK and sharia demanders will continue, the military bureaucracy will also remain as an effectual source in the politics of the country.

Both profession associations, labor organisations, and non-governmental organisations will continuously gain power and perform all duties given to them during the formation of the democratical social-state of law.

As long as it will continue obtaining supports from especially the neighboring countries and imperialist powers, PKK terror will not completely cease to exist and as the other power against these formations, there will be always some desires to change the democratical regime with a political Islam or with some other ideology.

Within this frame, political parties that are fully contaminated with dirty relations with plunderers who live out of city dwelling principles, will either clear themselves off from the present corruption, or they will lose all their guiding powers and will stay as ineffective cat's paw of "determining powers" mentioned above.

But still, despite of all these problems and hindrances, on the basis of historical development pace and peculiar characteristics of Turkey, we can confidently state that the democracy in Turkey will definitely reach maturity in the 21st century.

ROLES OF INDIVIDUALS: CONTRIBUTING TO THE REFORMATION

Beyond doubt, personal characteristics and general tendencies of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk are among the main individual factors which shaped the Turkish society. His faithfulness towards the Western world and bold leadership are the two identifiers that impact upon the reformation process of Turkey. If Mustafa Kemal would not emerge, would Anatolia be able to produce another Ataturk? What would be the result of the War of Independence, if it was commanded by a socialist Ataturk, but not by a Western-committed Ataturk? Was there any opportunity for the Ottoman society to produce a socialist leader who could pioneer and organise a national independence war? It is not possible to give clear answers to these questions. However, when we think over these matters, we realise both the importance of Mustafa Kemal's personality and the role of conditions that defined his ideological approach. Ottoman society ideologically stayed at the stage of French Revolution. Since the Westernisation in the Empire had developed away from any socialist trends, the Soviet Revolution could not exert any impact upon the Ottoman Empire.

Military genius of Ataturk was combined together with his political attributes. Later, his role of being a great statesman has become more explicit. All these abilities made it possible for him to organise actions against both the Sultan and the enemy who invaded Anatolia. Ataturk's emergence as a leader and the congruence of condition created by domestic and foreigner factors that induced the establishment of the Republic transferred Mustafa Kemal into Ataturk and provided a transformation occurred from the Empire into the system of nation-state.

Another person who affected the transformation of the Turkish society was Ismet Inonu. Just like Marx, the main approach of Inonu, was seeing the society as the balance of contradicting powers. His biggest ambition was to complete Ataturk's Revolution by contributing greatly to the

democracy of the country. For this, straight after the death of Ataturk, he expressed his plans about practicing democracy in his speech he gave in Istanbul University. Threats from Soviets which drew Turkey close to USA, were the main external factor of establishing the democratical regime into Turkey. However, this factor came into effect long time after the speech of Inonu. Pressures of developing bourgeoisie and conflicts over the land reform law were among the domestic factors for the application of democracy in Turkey. Domestic factors were also gain importance after Inonu had explained his intention. Besides, for a dictator like himself who was declared as a "national chief" and "eternal leader", it was not difficult to prevent or at least to detain these developments. Inonu was keeping all political, bureaucratic and military forces in the society under his control.

Ismet Inonu was also the product of the same conditions that created M.K. Ataturk. He was also believing in Western model. In addition to that, he was a devotee of the social structure defined by Ataturk's Revolution. This devotion prevented him to take many steps. For example, since the unity between the central bureaucracy, and landlords and "intermediate classes" had been established already during the War of Independence, in the 1940s, it was not possible anymore to constitute a comprehensive land reform. Because, landlords became a significant political and economical power within the social and economical structure of that time.

What would happen if Inonu did not put democratical applications into practice in 1946? Would the single party system render an opportunity for a faster economical growth? Or, would the social and economical development stop for a long time? We cannot generate accurate answers for these questions.

Bayar and Menderes affected the social transformation in Turkey from two aspects. Firstly, they remained on the same political pace started with Soviet threats in 1945 and made the country dependent more upon the West. Hence, for the sake of "Westernisation", the principle of "opposing imperialism" was omitted. Secondly, they applied pressures in the young democratical system, for protecting the interests of the capitalist class and caused the "etatist-elitist" bureaucrats to intervene to the politics. Despite attributing the superstructural institution of "social welfare state" to the society, the 1960 coup has also caused two negative effects. First, it caused the military bureaucracy to interfere with the politics. The action was conducted in the name of Ataturk. However, it caused a great damage for especially one of Ataturk's principles which is the principle of apoliticizing the military force. Ataturk struggled all his life for this principle. Whereas, the 1960 coup was against this principle. Besides, whatever purpose is pursued, a military action is in every manner, the enemy of a healthy democracy.

Secondly, the voters behaviors between 1950 and 1960 were indicating that if the elections would be held in 1960 or 1961, the CHP (Republican People's Party) would win. As the superstructural regulations were carried out by the military regime after the action of 27 May, were all goals pursued by CHP, if there would not any military coup happened, the same goals could have been achieved without the negative consequences of the military action. If an election had been made, certainly the "etatist-elitist" approach in CHP (because they would have come to the power naturally by an election) would ceased. And, erasure of such an approach which means to be broken from the public, would be a supportive step for the democracy in Turkey.

Because of these reasons, we cannot say that every action of Bayar-Menderes couple was constructive. On the other side however, the encouragement inspired by the Democrat Party to masses of people for participate actively in the political life and raising their political awareness, balance the negative effects of the Democrat Party.

Apart from their political roles, also believing firmly in capitalist progress, Bayar and Menderes

triggered the development of bourgeoisie. In this respect, the roles and choices about combining with the West for Bayar and Menderes were very not clear. Had it been possible for Turkey to resist against the infliction of the Soviets on its own? To what extent it was necessary to obey the West to be able to obtain a support against the Soviets? Was the fast economical growth predictable result of the economical policy applied until 1950? Did Bayar and Menderes have any other choice? What consequences would be gained if they would act more respectfully towards democratical principals? Answers to these questions will depict more clearly the personal effects of Bayar-Menderes couple upon the Turkish society.

Another person who played a major role in for the transformation of Turkish society was Cemal Gursel. Since Cemal Gursel, instead of the "Authoritarian Revolutionists" group, had supported the "Democratical Intervening" group of the National Committee for Unity (The committee conducted the military coup), the political aspects of our country gained the present attributes. If he had supported the authoritarian group, most likely today, the democratical powers would still be trying to save the people from so called "saviors".

Following Gursel, Cevdet Sunay become the President of Turkey and performed this duty between 1966 and 1973. Sunay acted as a supporter for nationalist organisations, rightist activists and religious schools. Because of this Inonu rejected to extent the Presidency of Sunay for the second time.

By adopting an opposing attitude to all democratic organisations and institutions during the coup of 12 March, Memduh Tağmaç, the Head of the General Staff, was a personality who played a negative role in imprisonment and torturing of many intellectuals and writers.

The Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel who resigned from this position on the 12th March also played a major role in Turkish Politics. As the leader of Adalet Partisi (Justice Party), he chose a more reconciling approach for the conflicts occurred in the society and instead of complaining about the 1961 Constitution, he worked unanimously with Sunay and supported the nationalist organisations and the spreading of religious schools. Hence, as a political strategy, they chose the way of organising the "opposing groups" against the "revolutionist" student organisations, instead of taking democratical measures against the problems created by these organisations. This strategy of him which was called "making the dog to be killed by the wolf" at that time and his continuous belittling attitudes against the 1961 Constitution invoked the reaction of the soldiers and at the end he was taken away from his position in the government by the military intervention.

However, despite being taken away from the political power, his general strategy was also adopted by the soldiers and consequently, both the 1961 Constitution was changed in a regressive manner, and the nationalist and Islamist tendencies gained power due to their supportive policies.

We can assert that by applying his general policies in the 1960s, Demirel caused the seeds of the regime crisis which broke out in the 1990s, to sprout.

After the 12th March event, when his party fell into disagreement with some parliament members, Celal Bayar founded Democrat Party opposing Demirel and he lost the chance of forming the government in the 1973 elections and gave way to the CHP-MSP coalition..

In the mid-1970s, he formed a coalition government called "the Nationalist Front" by uniting with the national conservatist front and the political Islam. During this government also, he followed a policy that intensified the violent actions of terrorist groups.

During this period of time, gang groups called themselves "ulkucu (idealists)" and leftist guerilla

groups called themselves "devrimci (revolutionists)" worked just like a killing machine and killed many innocent intellectuals whose only intention was to defend democracy. These murder organisations were so strong and spread into the state that their extensions were revealed even in much later years like the "Susurluk Scandal" happened in 1990.

During these developments, Demirel was again feeding the regime crisis between 1997 and 1998 by supporting fundamentalist groups and following religion-supporting policy.

Consequently, this strategy could not solve the problems of Turkey, either and soldiers once more removed Demirel from the political power with the 12 September intervention. This time however, both Demirel and all other political leaders were completely banned from participating actively in the political life.

Until the 1980 coup, the role of Demirel in the advancement of democracy in Turkey was not very positive. He both caused the principal institutions of the system to be degenerated and sowed the seeds of crisis happened in the future and paved the way for the military actions.

After a banned from politics which continued until 1987, Demirel was giving himself a renewed image when returned to politics. He was saying "we underestimated the intellectuals of this country and thought that we can make policies just with laborers and farmers. We were completely wrong." It seemed that he was affected by the interest and the efforts of intellectuals and democratical pressure groups for the abolishment of political bans over him and other political personalities.

He reflected this image to DYP (the Right Path Party) when entering the 1991 elections. He encouraged many intellectuals to enter the politics and made them to become candidates from his political party. Tansu Ciller was also a name appeared during this "image renewal" operation.

His propaganda during the 1991 elections was based on democratical slogans like "the police stations will be transparent, we will grant social securities to also housewives".

After Ozal died, he was selected as the President in 1994 with the support given by Erdal Inonu, the leader of Socialist Activity Party (SHP).

After he was elected as the President, he paid special attention to intellectuals, artists and people of letters and granted special Presidency rewards in art and literature branches. He joined concerts and commented the classical Western music concerts as the indicators of "polyphonic and contemporary life". He also exhibited himself on the side of the democratical secular regime, opposite of the fundamentalist trends.

During the regime crisis began with the 28 February declaration of the National Security Council, Demirel maintained close relations with army members, non-governmental organisations, mass media organisations and parliament members of DYP and provided a peaceful government change to be made legally through the parliamentary decision.

Demirel who was the president in the years close to the new millennium and the Prime Minister of 1960s and 1970s, by strengthening the democracy and its institutions, seemed to be very successful in solving the problems seeds of which were sown by himself.

Besides, it was very positive for an engineer who was once a shepherd to occupy the highest position of the "nation-state" established by Ataturk, since this situation was indicating that the "social activity canals directing towards upper levels" are flowing properly.

Another personality who exhibited great influence upon Turkey was Turgut Ozal.

Turgut Ozal became the deputy Prime Minister responsible for the economical affairs of the government established by the soldiers after the 12th September coup. This post was assigned to him because he was the architect of the famous 24th January Decisions taken by the Demirel's government in 1980 for the reformation of the economical structure of the country. The military regime demanded the economical policy to be continued on the same pace, hence requested Ozal who was not banned from politics to be responsible for the economical affairs.

Being very experienced and knowing very well the bureaucratic affairs, Ozal was an experienced politician who had been both the permanent undersecretary of State Planning Organisation and of the Prime Ministry. During the last period of Demirel government just before 1980, he performed the two duties both at the same time. This experience gave him the ability of applying policies very fast and effectively after he became the Prime Minister.

Since he obtained the support of both the USA, the army members and the big capital owners and also because he was an elected (not assigned) political leader, he was very courageous and fearless.

Since he attained both of the two attributes of bureaucratic experience and political courage in himself, in a very short time, he accomplished great reformations in the state and social structure.

He was an opponent to leftist tendency and a sincerely believing political Islamist. As he expressed to his friends; "Until now everybody was trying to spread the religion of Islam into the society. However, the real concern is to Islamize the state itself."

In this respect, he really changed the aspects of Turkey both positively and negatively. Although it was not allowed neither by the Constitution, nor any other legal means, he abolished the monopoly of radio-television. He abrogated the Law of Protecting Turkish Money, although it caused scandals of imaginary exports, he insistingly improved the exporting and made the national money convertible. Through the investments towards telecommunication, he connected Turkey to the other parts of the world. He encouraged and guided the merchants, industrialists and building contractors towards foreign markets.

Meanwhile, he maintained the system exactly as he inherited from the soldiers. He provided the articles of the criminal code that protects the country against communism and fundamentalism to be abolished. However later, by promulgating the Law for Combatting Terrorism, illegal areas, except those included in political Islam, have been the subject of heavy pressures.

During the economical initiatives, he openly gave responsibilities to his own relatives. He used the state banks in favor of his own friends. There had been so many corruption events that even murders committed because of conflicts occurred during the sharing of bribes.

He caused a shake in the moral values of the society by saying that "the principals and moral values of the modern man are not fixed, these values change according to where you earn your living". By saying that "my civil servant knows his own advantages", he encouraged bribery. Also by saying that "I like the rich of the Muslims", he connected even the sublime feelings of religion to money.

As a consequence of policies followed by his government, poor became poorer and riches became richer and this caused a great imbalance of income in the society.

In order to compensate the damages caused by his strategy, he legalised the squatter population's exploitation who live in shanties (gecekondu) out of the city concept by giving them legal ownership of the lands that they intrude.

During all these applications, he actively used the political Islam. He both attained the support of it and gave support to it and opened the way for Islamic initiatives.

He also intervened to the military bureaucracy and prevented it to grow as a power independent from himself.

He connected the security forces of the country to his control and used them according to his own personal relations.

At the end, when he became a President after Evren, he lost his performance. He worn himself out too much with domestic and foreign travels and died from a heart attack in 1993.

Since I mentioned in the other parts of the book, I will not explain in detail the heritage he left to Turkey. However, I will at least state that he left his "political style" as an example for Ciller to whom he left the Prime Ministry.

Ataturk, Inonu, Bayar, Menderes, Gursel, Sunay, Demirel and Ozal. All these leaders and politicians played major roles in reforming the Turkish society. Since these people emerged just in the time of important social changes, their impacts upon the society had been more than ordinary political leaders. On the other hand, we must remember that the main attributes of societies create social stages that cause the emergence of such leaders.

THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF SOCIAL CHANGING MODEL OF TURKISH SOCIETY

The social changing model of Turkish society formed by the people's interaction with the internal and external factors. At the beginning, this was a heavily ideological model. A strong administrator elite group (the Ottoman bureaucracy) presented an ideological model. Later, this Western type ideological guidance itself started to be affected by the social and economical developments. Thus, an interaction began between the superstructural institutions which were imposed onto the society and the substructural developments. At the end of this dialectical process, bureaucracy differentiated within itself. The "traditionalist-liberal" groups of the bureaucracy commingled with the improved bourgeoisie. Whereas the "etatist-elitist" groups stood at the opposite side and tried to balance the uncontrolled growth of the capitalist development. Since both of these groups were devotees of social, economical and political development path of the West, the interaction between each other firstly resulted the capitalism, secondly the democracy and thirdly the emergence of a weak working class. Since the development of bourgeoisie required unity with Western economies it was inevitable to collaborate with the West. When this compulsory collaboration resulted by internal factors, was also supported by external factors like the Soviets threat, Turkey got established in its present position. All events like the disintegration of the Soviets Union, Customs Union, 27 May, 12 March and 12 September, referendum for political rights, closure of Welfare Party have all served to strengthen this position of Turkey.

Receding from being a satellite country, Turkey now is on the way to become a central country on the crossroads of the North-South and East-West directions. Its success on this way depends on the speed of strengthening its democracy and economy.

In summary, two dialectical stages are seen in the social reformation of Turkish society. The first stage involves the interaction between the internal development factors, external factors and personal factors related to the personalities of leaders. The second stage involves the interaction between ideological impositions and social and economical changes. This second stage can at the same time be defined as the interaction between the superstructural developments and the substructural variables (Kongar, 1972:228-235).

A POLITICAL REFORMATION MODEL FOR ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ONLY SOME CLUES

Turkish political changing process can be theorised in four stages. The first stage is the forming stage for reactions. In this stage, an ideology which objects the economical and social order at the time. If the social and economical order was under the dominion of foreigners, this ideology was most likely against imperialism. The main resources of the ideology are the historical aspects of the society and the most developed countries of the world. Because the social and economical structure that the ideology opposes is the product of these historical aspects. The past of a nation (its history) determines the errors needed to be avoided or eradicated. On the other hand, the most advanced societies of the outer world constitute examples for the methods to be used for social, political and economical advancement. During this stage, the group that forms and defends this type of ideology, stand out in the society with their distinguished differences. Since the class formations in such societies are not mature yet, the group forming the ideology is either a part of the ruling elite, or very close to them. In Turkish case, the developed ideology was against the dominion of the Sultan and imperialism, based upon Western type of public dominion. Involving the military bureaucracy, the group that developed this ideology was a part of the ruling elitism.

The second stage is seizing the political power. At this stage, the group owning the new ideology come to power. Since the class development in these societies is immature, it is obligatory to capture the ruling power in order to control the social, political and economical events and to stimulate a change in the society. Capturing the political power can only be through a revolution or a War of Independence. During this stage, a unity is established between the revolutionists and the other parts of the society. If the country is not under the invasion of another country, instead of a revolution, the ruling power is captured through a coup d'etat. Because in technologically undeveloped countries, there is not a highly advanced class differentiation that can cause a revolution against the present order. In Turkey, the invasion of Anatolia by enemies initiated the War of Independence which at the same time was against the present order. During this war, revolutionists moved together with "ashraf" and "ayan" of the society.

The third stage is the application period. At this stage, the group that got hold of the political power, begin to form the society according to their own ideology. In this transformation from the old system to the new, two primary means are used: Establishment of new institutions and instillation of the new ideology to the society. In order to realise a fast social and economical advancement, new applications are practiced in accordance with the adopted model. To reach the nearest level to the example country, generally short-cuts are used to reach the same results in a short time. During this stage, some class developments also begin in line with the general approaches of the ruling group. In parallel to the class formations, separations appear among the ruling group. While some groups join together with the strongest class, others may stay impartial. The adaptation process of the society to the new new ideology is determined by the interaction between the newly emerged different classes of the ruling group.. During this stage, the peculiar characteristics of the society start to affect the ideological model. Therefore, the ideological model

that wanted to be applied lose some of its theoretical attributes. The six principles of the Republic in Turkey are the factors of the ideological model wanted to be applied in Turkey. The Ataturk revolutions represented by these six principles form the institutional management that were practiced to shape the society according to the Western model. Principles like the "etatism" and "publicanism" are the short-cuts to the capitalist development. The emergence of the Democrat Party defines the division appeared amongst the ruling elite. The terms of the rule of CHP and governments of Democrat Party after 1946 represent the periods when the interaction between opposing groups are allowed to provide that the Ataturk revolutions will be adopted the by the society. Abandoning the opposition of imperialism, softening the principle of secularism, giving up from the linguistic revolution are the samples of deviations occurred during these interactions.

The forth and the last stage is institutionalising the reforms required by the model in an acceptable way by the society. Unions established by the classes within the ruling elite with the opposing groups in the society are clearer in this stage. At the end of two main progress, conflicts appear between social classes or between various interest groups are solved with peaceful means anymore, like the democracy and unions. One of the two progresses is attributing the widespread use of democratical rights and freedom to the society. The second progress is the establishment of strong, autonomous, legal, social and cultural institutions which are founded to balance the political power which may tend to suppress the rights and freedoms and reformation trends of the society. Five years following the 1960 coup depicts this period.

The political model which briefly explained above is based upon the dialectic interactions between the ruling elite and social classes which emerged on two important points. The first point is the beginning of the stage of seizing the political power. At this point, if the society has reached a certain level of class development, that is, if the class structure of the society is at a level of affecting the politics in the country, the ruling elite have to take the forces of various social classes exerting against each other into consideration. Because their both ideologies and their programs will affected from the social classes. This situation forms not only the methods of the group that want to seize the ruling power, but also their ideology. And this of course limits the choices for the ruling elite. However, the revolutionist or military coup d'etat groups still attain the power of affecting the class structure of the society.

The second important point appears when the separation among the ruling elite occur. If the separation amongst the ruling elite is deprived of a class structure that supports this process, it cannot generate new interactions. On the contrary, the interaction between diverse thoughts and ideas would be prevented and one of these groups may dominate over the others and suppress the opposing thoughts and ideas. The differentiation amongst the ruling elite can be continuous only if it has a meaningful support from classes.

Moreover, another truth to be mentioned here is the effect of external factors. The model explained earlier can only be valid and can be applied only if there is not any reverse effects of internal or external factors. If the international economy and politics affect the society completely negatively, this model may not mean anything.

Here, only the role of the individuals (leaders) within the frame of politics can act as a accelerator or decelerator.

SOME MISTAKES ABOUT THE EXPERIMENT OF TURKISH POLITICAL CHANGE

We should warn our readers at this stage of our analyses. Turkish social changing experiment is a case depicting attributes which we did not have a chance to observe in any other example. Because of this, on the basis of the stages that Turkey went through, we cannot extract some general rules

that are also valid for other societies. An example for this can be given from the political life. A universal politically development model based on the Turkish model was suggested by Frederick Frey. According to this model, the order "first allows the organisation of the opponent political group; secondly, re-arranging the political power structure in the society by applying some changes to election laws, gives an opportunity for the opponent group to obtain the ruling power and thirdly, when the organised opponent group wins the elections and form the government through legal ways, passes on to them the political power." (Frey, 1965:416) Although it seems incredibly theoretical, this model reflects the political process that the Turkish society experienced after the establishment of the Republic. However, Frey did not base his model upon a social content. Because of this it is impossible to use the model for explaining the political development processes of other societies. Whereas, if class formation developments in one society emerge in the way explained above, then this model would be meaningful for the countries under concern.

A modernisation model that is based upon the social variables was developed by Daniel Lerner. Lerner tries to use his so-called universal model to explain the process Turkish social reformation. According to this, "the modernisation model of the West has certain factors and order that are valid for the whole world. For example, in every corner of the world, increasing urbanisation causes a rise in the rate of literacy in the society; the increased literacy causes people to enter more into the affecting area of mass media means; the increase of effect of mass media means causes a higher economical participation (in respect to income rates per person) and a more active participation to politics (giving votes). This model was emerged as a historical fact in the West. It will be shown that the same model is valid for all developing countries, disregarding the differences of race, language or faith." (Lerner, 1964:46). This is a typical mistake of Lerner. He reckoned the developmental model of the West is universal and attempted to explain the highly peculiar Westernisation reformation of Turkey with this model. Two mistakes in the model of Lerner strike our attention. Firstly, the rate of political participation in Turkey did not rise gradually as Lerner claims, but risen straight after the multipartite system had been started. On the other hand, the high rate of participation occurred in 1950 and the events occurred in the 1970s were not the products of urbanisation, but were the results of society being defined by classes anymore. At this point, the second mistake of Lerner appears. It is not possible to correlate between the urbanisation and the literacy rate in Turkey. The literacy rate was at its highest between 1923 and 1950, whereas the urbanisation intensified more after the 1950s.

Examples given above are very important in showing how wrong it is to generalise reformation processes. Actually, the social reformation conditions which are very peculiar to Turkey even mislead some Turkish researchers. For example Dogan Avcioglu, a Turkish political scientist, claims that when the multipartite order had began, the progressivist period of the Republic ended (Avcioglu, 1973:331). Hence, it is thought that as if the level which was reached in 1945 was not the outcome of the controlled efforts that had been spent since 1923. In reality however, the social and economical structure of Turkey in 1945 was the inevitable consequence of events occurred even before 1923. The point that Avcioglu did not see is, in an economically not very wealthy country which stands between the two basic principles of anti-imperialism and Westernisation, a conflict would definitely emerge. Since by following a Western type development model based upon the propulsion of the bourgeoisie, the country will definitely have to cooperate with the West, it has to either give up the idea of Westernisation or anti-imperialism. Besides, in the model that I offered, the short-cuts (like the etatism) used to accelerate the capitalist development during the *application* stage between 1923 and 1939 seem to mislead the author. Even after the 1970s, Avcioglu asserts that in Turkey, a "national-revolutionist" development model which is different from the American or communist models, could be applied (Avcioglu, 1973:670-676). (Avcioglu calls American model the capitalist model which actually developed by England). This mistake originates from confusing the historical stages of Turkey with each other.

The model presented by Avcioglu is based upon the ruling elite and can only be applied in societies in which there are no class development and differentiation. Turkey however, has been a country of diverse groups and classes by the 1970s. When compared to the political model I offered, then it means that Avcioglu defends only the operations valid for either the stage of *seizing the political power*, or the stage of *application*. These operations would not be valid for the stage of *institutionalising*. Because at this stage, the bureaucracy which is defined by Avcioglu as the organiser of the economical development, completed its duty as the "ruling-elite" and now it entered under the effect and control of the class differentiation formed in the society. Quite naturally, some short paths can also be used during the last stage of institutionalising to be able to achieve fast economical developments. And these paths maybe not compatible with the classical models developed in the West (that is, the capitalist and collectivist models). However, application methods of "the short-cuts" will be determined by the governments which are matured by means of their strong relations with social classes, not by the bureaucracy (civilian or military) that completed its duty in the society and lost its functionality. Bureaucracy will only apply the decisions taken by the government anymore. In the stage of "institutionalising", it does not seem to be possible for a "ruling elite" group to capture the political power and make reforms according to their own ideologies.

Consequently, during and following the time of transferring to nation-state stage, the three mistakes which are generally made when conceptualising the Turkish social and political reformation process which constitutes an original model in moving from being a satellite state towards a central state, can be summarised as such: **One**, to use the Turkish model in forming universal models. **Two**, to use the universal models to explain the Turkish model. **Three**, to regard the stages that have passed and gone as also valid for the future. I wanted to call the readers' attention to these three mistakes to warn them for deficiencies and errors that may be found in the political model I roughly presented. Because I may have fallen into the same trap.

10.SUMMARY AND CONSEQUENCES

I tried to analyze the social structure and reformation of Turkey within the frame of a model with three factors (I also attempted to constitute a small political model). These three factors are: The *outer world*, *ideology* and *class development*. According to me, the social-scientific model with these three factors is universal. In other words, *structures and reformation lines of all societies in the world can be analyzed within the frame of these three factors*. The functionality of the model depends on a very intense interaction amongst the factors. Each factor affects and is affected by the other factors. For example, the class development is significantly affected by the ideology, however, when a strong class structure is formed, the newly emerged class or classes begin to re-shape the ideology. This is the same for Russia, China, America, England, France or any other country. Quite naturally, the same process was experienced also in Turkey. The only difference between these countries is for the ideology and class development to be supportive or confounding towards each other. That is, in some countries the reformation appeared in the ideological field caused a class reformation in the same direction, whereas in other countries an opposite situation occurred.. However the result has been always the same; neither a class development without an ideology, nor an ideological reformation without a class development can be possible.

On the other hand, the outer world factor of the model is an independent factor which shows its effect gradually and continually. However, although being an independent factor, it is definitely under the effect of the other two factors. In other words, there is no doubt that the political, social and economical formations occurring in the world affect the internal structure of any nation on earth. However, all these effects are in line with the change of internal structures of countries.

Another point needs to be considered about the intense interaction between the factors (or more scientifically stating, independent variables) is the quality of the interaction. This interaction has a dialectical attribute. In other words, one of the factors affects the other factor or factors either in parallel to itself or in the opposite direction. In other times however, the interaction between two opposite factors may result in a completely new direction. One of the best examples of this situation is the colonialism and reactions shown against it. Colonialism has sometimes been a spark for a national war of independence, whereas some other times it turned into relations in which the "imperialism" is incessantly continued. Because of this, during the process of the model as which factor affects which factor and in what manner, the direction of the interaction is also important. Sometimes, the interaction between the opposite factors may create outcomes that are as strong as those can be seen as the result of combination of factors in the same direction.

Lastly I shall mention about the model I asserted that the interaction between the factors must fit in an historical frame. Every society is formed after long and intricate processes. Because of this our model can be meaningful only when it is considered from a historical point of view. Otherwise, the model will not be valid if each factor is not considered in coordination with its own historical development and its dialectical relations with other factors.

Now, I will try to concretize all these theoretical explanations with a few examples:

The pressure exerted by various factors onto the same point caused Turkey to enter the multipartite system. Ismet Pasha's ambition to complete and surpass Ataturk, the development of bourgeoisie in the society, the collapse of fascist regimes in the world, advices given by the USA to pass into multipartite system, ideologic background about obtaining attributes similar to those of the West, have all combined on the same point and in the end, despite all difficulties, between 1945 and 1950, Turkey inevitably prepared the conditions for transiting from closed system to open system.

On the other hand, during the period of 1950-1960, strengthening relations of Turkey with the West depict an example that the class development diversely affecting the ideology. Bourgeoisie (private enterprise) which was a product of Ataturk's ideology, after a certain developmental period, attempted to corporate with the West in order to obtain more power and thus changed the principle of anti-imperialism of the ideology which created the bourgeoisie itself. Every criticism towards the imperialism was blamed for supporting communism, consequently for deviating from the path of Ataturkism.

Each of these factors have exerted different amount of impacts, in different times. For example, in the periods when class development slowed down, politics has been the means for shaping the society according to the current ideology. That is, during such periods the most important factor has been the ideology and the politics was its tool. However, when the class development accelerated, emerged new classes began to affect the society through the ideology. This time, the politics was not a determinative power anymore and was only a reflector of the events occurred in the society. In other words, while the society was previously formed by the politics, afterwards the emerged social classes started to rule over the politics. The ruling politician and political party of yesterday have become today the servant of the society. (The politician and political parties that comprehend this reality and act accordingly will be able to survive, whereas those who do not understand this condition will cease to exist.)

The same analysis is also valid for the economics. During the establishment years of the Republic, the economical structure was so weak that it could be directed towards a collectivist or capitalist order. In this case, the ideology of the ruling class was dominant and the economy progressed under the control of the ideology. (Actually to tend towards capitalism was easier because of the

effect of Ottoman heritage.) However, when the economy strengthened sufficiently, it took over the dominance upon the ideology. *And, the problem today is not the formation of the society according to the ideologies of people claimed themselves to be intellectuals, but the real problem is what type of structure suitable to their ideologies, the strong social classes and groups aim to achieve and how strong they are to reach that goal.*

Consequently I can state that, to only use the right model and the correct factors is not adequate to obtain true judgments about Turkish society. It is also necessary to know the direction and the quality of the interactions between these factors and their prominence relative to each other.

Because of this, when judging the events of the future, one must not forget the great impact of class formation. The development trend today shows that in Turkish society, the democratical rights and freedoms are used more widespread and the national income is distributed more justly. In this respect, I tried to explain the clues showing the conditions of the future in the sections of "Politics", "Economy", "Urbanisation", "Family" and at the end of analyses about the income distribution. All these clues openly depict that Turkey is developing towards a social and economical order in which a more public participation involved. However, we should also be able to guess what sort of developments the general forming direction of the society will cause.

GLOBALISATION AND NEW SYNTHESSES

In the future, what will happen in Turkey?

Actually, what sort of Turkey is awaiting for us?

What are the concrete results of the analyses that we conducted until now?

What type of syntheses are expected for the future of the country?

Answers to these questions depend upon the determination of the *main processes* that will affect the country and the *determinant powers* that will be dominant over the administration.

Analyses conducted until now show us that Turkey will be under the effect of three main processes.

The first process is the *globalisation* which comes from the outer world and exerts different impacts upon the political, economical and cultural areas.

The second process is the *urbanisation* which is characterised by illegal constructions and is represented by the plundering culture of the squatters that also laid hands on the politics.

The third process is the *democratisation*, the system based upon the widespread and influential participation of the public, both comes from the historical roots of the Republic and is supported by the universal formations.

Determinant powers that have developed with the interaction of the internal and external dynamical factors and reached now in the 21st century, a level to direct Turkey, seem to form around three groups.

The first power is the *United States of America* that have been playing major roles in the reformation and in defining the external relations of Turkey, and also strengthened this position especially with the globalisation process.

The second power is the *big capitalists* who were supported through all stages of the Republic and who attained the highest level of power by also capturing the possession of mass media means.

The third power is the *military bureaucracy* that played a determinant role in the transfer from the

empire to a nation-state and has been of great importance in combatting against PKK and "religionist state threat".

Now we will examine these three processes and three powers very briefly.

Globalisation is a universal process which emerged in the 21st century based upon primarily the "technological revolution" and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union which was constituting an alternative system to capitalism (Saylan, 1994:113-141; 150-163).

The real power behind the globalisation is the technological leaping occurred mainly in the electronic and hence in the communicational field.

This irresistible great "force of communication" (power of media) which affects all humanbeings either individually or nationally, the religious or cultural groups have increased tremendously especially after attaining a uni-centered position following the dissipation of the Soviets.

Affecting the whole world with this highly complex and irresistible power, the globalisation process appeared to have four distinctive characteristics in three separate areas.

The first characteristic of globalisation is the dominion of the United States of America and it being put on an act of "policing the whole world". Being interfered, apart from the areas like the "Gulf War" which directly related to its own security, also in the war broke out in former Yugoslavia, The United States of America is trying to reach the goal of "Pax Americana" in the 21st century. Its unrivaled military and technological power provides America this opportunity. If any unexpected event will not happen, we can say that the world will be intensely affected by the political and military power of the United States in the 21st century.

The second characteristic of globalisation can be seen as the domination of the international capital in the economical area. The international capitalists shaped both investment and consumption decisions of countries and regions according to their own expectations and what is more, with the great amount of hot-cash flowing very fast, they can even affect the daily conjuncture.

The United States is not on exact line with the international capital. In other words, the economical attributes of globalisation is not fully identical to its political identity. Although the economical power is in some degree controlled by the political power, the international capitalists exhibit behaviors like widening its own activity areas and seeking maneuvers which are relatively independent from the political power.

The third area of the globalisation is the cultural area. In respect to its effects in cultural area, globalisation exhibits two different and contradicting features.

The first cultural effect, that is the third characteristic of globalisation is about forming a uniform consuming culture in the whole world. The whole world is conditioned to wear the same make trousers, to use same make trainers, to eat the same type of burgers and to drink the same sort of fizzy drinks without regarding any differences of religion, language or race. Behind this formation lies both the great power of international capitalists and the irresistible influence of mass media means.

This impact of globalisation tends to turn the whole world to a single market in which there are people who share the same life style, carry the same expectations and exhibit the same consuming habits.

The film industry, book publishing and other cultural and literature activities contribute to the creation of the "uniform culture". Here I must warn the reader that the activities of art and literature have also opposite effects to globalisation.

The second cultural effect, that is the fourth characteristic of globalisation is to strengthen the micro-nationalist trends by all the time supporting the different identification claims and formations. In our diminishing world, every kind of faith followed in the world as well as all different religions, languages, nations, sects, regions and traditions are tolerated and welcomed and all these "different identities" are developed under protection.

What lies behind both the universal developments related to human rights and the acceptance of different identities, is to convince the people for the imposed consuming values. This formation is also compatible with the political and economical features of globalisation, because by confining politically the powers of nation-states, it will no doubt ease the way to govern the whole world from one center.

As the productions of art and literature serve the formation of a single-dimensioned consuming society, in the same way, they also serve the opposite situation and punctuate different identities.

Within the frame of political and economical dimensions of globalisation, this dual effect which originates from the basic characteristics of art and cultural activities in the fields of fine arts and literature is tried to be kept under the control of the USA and the international capitalists.

Lastly about the globalisation I would like to underline one very important fact: The process of globalisation is not only Turkey-oriented or a process peculiar only to Turkey. It is a universal process and will affect Turkey together with all other regions in the world. Because of this, to figure the matter in a xenophobic way and try to find solutions in the whirlpools of chauvinism which is formed with enmity towards foreigners or fear of strangers who live in the other parts of the world will may drag the people into queer cal de sacs.

The most rational strategy to be applied in this matter is to accelerate the application of policies that will ascend the country from the "satellite" position onto a "central" position.

The second process that will affect Turkey in the 21st century is the universal "urbanisation". Being called in general "urbanisation", this process gained special features which are peculiar to Turkey. We can itemise these features as below:

Firstly, the urbanisation process has created "areas which are developed out of city laws" (like squatters settlements) in Turkey. In other words, the urbanisation process called "gecekondu" spread in Turkey out of every legal system and thus the principle of "state of law" which was one of the most important characteristics of the nation-state established by the Republic, was abolished.

Secondly, the success and dominion of savage forces against the legal order in gecekondu areas formed a new type of culture. Among these groups who are already separated from the traditional feudal culture, but could not adopt either the urban industrial culture and because of this are open to any type of degeneration, a completely new culture (!), the "culture of plundering" has emerged.

Thirdly, the prevalence of urban land plundering and illegal building sites urged the local and central political powers to intervene to obtain their share from the system. However, since these interventions were conducted without any proper plan and because they were applied only for the intention of obtaining a share from the plundering, the public authorities have also become an

accomplice to the guilt of plundering the city areas.

Fourthly, since the urbanisation process in Turkey caused the big unearned incomes from city lands to be captured by using brute force and since the public authorities are also involved in this process, all planned urbanisation activities have been prevented. Therefore, to live peacefully in big cities has become nearly impossible since neither the traffic flows smoothly, nor any public services are given adequately.

Fifthly, ghetto areas appeared which are based upon diverse income groups in the cities in which it is impossible to live anymore because of all developments mentioned above. To be able to survive despite the inadequate public services, higher income owners have confined themselves in self-serviced housing estates which are surrounded with high walls and equipped with special security systems. However, in the uncivilised quarters developed out of city dwelling principles, close compatriot, neighborhood and kinship relations have been established and these people formed very unhealthy dwelling places in which the small factories and houses are commingled in the same area.

The sixth result is more grievous: The "plundering culture" developed in these areas first combined with the local authorities through their "refined families" who became rich with the brute force and illegal means of this culture. Later, they diffused through the delegation system of political parties and in national level, they laid hands on all political parties. Thus, the political system that shapes the whole Turkey fell under the control of plunderers.

Being the result of the immaturity of the democratical regime in Turkey, this degeneration surely caused a confusion in the public opinion about the "representative democracy" being either a bandit regime or a plundering regime.

Together with the involvement of politicians, a condition evolved in which although plunders seem to get richer, but in fact everybody lost income because of the social common life became poorer.

What really dreadful was that the political institutions and mechanisms which are expected to solve the problems, themselves became problem generators due to the effect of plundering culture upon the political system through the interaction of delegate-general leader of political parties.

As long as the whole political system, mainly including the delegation system of political parties, is not renewed this degenerating urbanisation process will continue to negatively affect the society and there will be no way to clear these effects.

The third process that will affect Turkey in the 21st century is the democratisation which is supported by both internal and external dynamic factors.

Democratisation will be the most important and the most effective process of the future since it was the inevitable result of the transformation from being an empire into a nation-state and because the class structure needed for the natural functioning of the democracy has been mostly completed by the social and economical developments in Turkey.

An interesting point here is that the political parties and majority groups still could not prevent the use of democratical rights and freedoms to eradicate the democratical order and could not generate a democratical reflex protecting the democratical order against any threat.

As first seen in 1950s and unfortunately was still practiced even in 1990s that the ruling parties

tended to misuse their political power merely to continue their domination and protected only their own interests. This situation caused interventions first of which unfortunately ended with a military coup and executions of three statesmen, yet the last of which was carried out with democratical methods completed within the Parliament and through legal ways.

During the first intervention, the military bureaucracy was in cooperation with only the university youth, some newspapers and the opposition party, whereas during the last intervention, the action was supported by vast groups of people, non-governmental organisations, big newspapers, broadcasting companies, opposition parties, some part of parliament members and this time the President.

In 40 years time following the 1960 coup, parliament members of ruling parties attained the power to object the ruling party or parties to use the political power to damage the democracy. However they still needed the support of the army and the President to use this attribute.

Despite of all concerns, it should not be thought in any way to diminish the use of rights and freedoms 70 years after the establishment of the Republic and 50 years after the beginning of the multipartite system. The greatest guarantee of the democratical order should have been the big capital classes, well organised strong labor organisations and non-governmental organisations. More importantly, none of the political parties, neither the ruling nor the opposition parties, should have yearned for such interventions.

One of the biggest reasons for Turkey to experience such problems even at the beginning of the 21st century is that Turkey would like to complete the formation of the nation-state much quicker than the West which had completed its democratical process through long historical stages. For classes and groups that will benefit from the democracy not to assimilate fully the democratical regime yet and mistakes of the institutions that are accustomed to act as "regulators" have delayed this process. For example, by using conflicts occurred between civilians, and the widespread terrorism and anarchy, the military bureaucracy restricted the democracy during the coups of 1971 and 1980 and weakened the development of labor and non-governmental organisations and thus prevented the public to reach a democratical maturity.

In this respect, the democratisation process in Turkey should not have been a duty claimed by the military bureaucracy, but should have been a formation which is adopted and absorbed by the contemporary classes, groups and organisations, especially by all politicians who are supposed to be the representatives of all these groups.

The democratisation process that will affect Turkey in the 21st century will also develop around these principles. In other words, the democratisation process will be an antidote for the individual and organised plundering and will be the cure for every type of dictatorial desires, briberies and improprieties and it will become mature with the widespread participation of masses of people and conscious contemporary classes that will attain more power in parallel to development of the society.

This process will gain acceleration not only because it is suitable to the model of Ataturk for transforming an empire into a nation-state, but also because the domestic substructural developments and the outer world will exert impact in that direction. The two major problems in front of Turkey, PKK terror and political Islamists' desires to establish a sharia law in the country instead of the democratic regime will be deflated only after the democracy is spread amongst the whole society and contemporary classes and when it is completely absorbed by the political institutions.

In other words, desires for establishing regimes other than democracy can only be eliminated by improving the democracy more and giving it attributes that allow the regime to defend itself.

The necessity of democratisation process is also emphasized from another point by the unjust income distribution. Just as the use of democratical rights and freedoms without any discrimination of faith, language, class, region or culture, obtaining equal economical opportunities is also one the main functions of Turkish Republic in the 21st century.

Globalisation, urbanisation and democratisation processes will sometimes exert preventive impacts upon each other. For example, the intensification of urbanisation in areas which develop illicitly and produce a plundering culture causes a direct hindrance before democratisation.

On the other hand, the development of plundering culture degenerated the whole political system and dialectically this situation will necessitate the progression of democratisation process.

Within the frame of globalisation, demands of the United States of America and European Union to improve the use of fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey is the supportive effect of globalisation upon the democratisation.

In this respect, the concept of which process will affect the society in what measure, takes us to the field of powers that will rule in Turkey in the 21st century.

Being *the first power*, the United States will surely lookout first for its own benefits. However, because of its adopted role of policing the world and the responsibility about the human rights, the United States is expected to give support to the democratisation process in Turkey even only in appearance. The European Union, one of the major powers that will affect upon the globalisation of Turkey, will also exert its authority in the same direction.

Big capitalists, that is *the second power*, will definitely support the democratisation in order to defend their long-term interests and to provide a stability for the regime.

The irregularity of the plundering culture also disturbs the big capitalists. Because, the air pollution, traffic jams, damaging the state of law by narrowing and restricting the common living areas, disturb mostly this group of people who want to live in high standards and also will benefit from the smooth functioning of the system.

Another concept in the 21st century that will strengthen the administrative power of big capitalists is the possession of mass media means. This possession will nearly endlessly increase their power on one hand, and on the other hand, will load them with a great responsibility:

Since raising moral conscious of the society and forming consumption models, that is, socialising the individual and "reproducing the society" is the responsibility of mass communication means as well as the families and schools, big capitalists are also a subject anymore to public inspection.

In this respect, big capitalists, whether they like it or not, will have to support the democratisation process. They know that otherwise they will be harmed in parallel to the damage given to the system.

Being *the third power*, military bureaucracy is not a separate class within itself. Within the frame of Atatürk's principles and in line with the historical tradition, military bureaucrats regard

themselves as the "observer and protector of the modern Turkish Republic" as mentioned in the laws.

In combatting against PKK terror, in protecting the democratical (hence the secular) regime, military bureaucracy will adopt a supportive manner for democratisation process, because both the Ataturk's ideological principles require this and there is no other way to act anyway. Of course, the military bureaucrats would take their lessons from the mistakes made in coups of 27th May, 12th March and 12th September.

Quite naturally, the relations of the military bureaucracy with the other two effective powers, that is the United States of America and big capitalists will determine its own conduct and will affect the attitudes of the other two powers.

The main problem about the democracy is the efforts of imposing the "plundering culture" that is dominant nearly in every political party, as "democracy" to the society and indifferent manners of both individuals and private and public enterprisers against the possibilities of pillaging behaviors.

Within this frame, we can say that the democratisation will be the most definitive process in the 21st century, not only in spreading the use of fundamental rights and freedoms, but also reinforcing the social welfare state of law by re-determining the concept of "representative democracy".

GENERAL TENDENCIES OF VOTERS

The interaction between the three processes and the three powers I briefly analysed above will occur in the same "environment". And this environment is formed by the "public opinion" of the people we call "voters".

We shall take a glance at tendencies of voters in the 21st century, which is the environment itself. Because the future of the country is greatly related to where we stand now and what we expect from the future, in other words, general characteristics of our people.

Esmer and **Kalaycioglu** applied the same research which was conducted between 1990 and 1991 and between 1996 and 1997 in more than 40 societies comprising the 70% of the world population, to also Turkey.

Known as "Research of World Values", this research was conducted in Turkey under the name of "Turk Toplumunun Degerleri" (Values of Turkish Society).

According to the results of this research, one forth of Turkish community regard themselves contented at a degree of five out of ten which is an average level (Esmer, 1997). Nearly half of the whole number of voters consider themselves happy more than the average rate. This rate is nearly the same in both 1991 and 1997. When Esmer compared these results with those of Western countries, he states that the rate of unhappy individuals is little more in Turkey, however there is not a widespread pessimism in the country.

Results for the concept of "hopefulness" are as below:

The rate of those who are not hopeful for the future of the world is 59% which is the same rate for the West as well. However, when our people compared the past with today, they consider today's

conditions worse. They think that the best days were lived in the past, however, at the same time, they hope that the future will be better than today. Those who say "matters today are not good" comprise the 60% of voters. The rate of those who say that "matters were worse ten years ago" is 38% and the rate of those who say that "matters will be worse ten years later" is 51%.

People who are contented about the present situation of the country comprise only 12% of voters. Again for ten years intervals, those who say that "it was better in the past" comprise the 38% and those who say that "it will be better in the future" comprise the 28%. Therefore, half of voters are not very hopeful for the future, but they still think that the future will be better than today.

Another reliable research received the answers below to the question of "How is the general situation of Turkey in recent years?":

77.8% of participants said "it's bad",

9.3% of participants said "it's good",

8.4% of participants said "I have no idea". (Erder, N., 1996:122)

These results can be evaluated as judgments for the "present situation". The data obtained here are compared with data obtained in 1993 in the same research and depicts that pessimism has increased from 1993 to 1996.

One of the most important factors of the society is no doubt for individuals of society to feel confidence in other members of the society. Findings of the research in this matter is very interesting. Esmer states that: "According to the results of 1990 Research of World Values, Turkey was one of the two lowest countries which depicted the lowest rate of confidence. However, according to the results of 1997, the results became worse." According to the results of the research, while in 1991, the rate of people who consider the people in Turkey as trustworthy is 10%, this rate decreases to 6.6% in 1997. The same rate is 36% in USA, 60% in Sweden, 42% in Japan and 52% in China. Only Philippines fall behind Turkey with a rate of 6%.

This is the finding showing the result of the spread of "plundering" culture which I examined earlier: After the demolishing of the state of law in Turkey, since the traditional friendly relations have also weakened, people started feel strange against each other and do not trust to other people.

Results about the trust to institutions are also very interesting: The most reliable institution is the army with a rate of 71%. Whereas the least reliable institutions are political parties with a rate of 6%. Esmer states this about the result:

"From 1991 to 1997, vote of confidence for political parties and the parliament decreased even more. This non-confidence is so much that we trust even more to institutions like the European Union and United Nations. Looking from whatever direction, the record of vote of non-confidence belong to our political parties. However, we must not forget that the rate of confidence to political parties and politicians is generally low in every part of the world including the Western countries." (Esmer, 1997)

About confidence, the situation of the newspapers is not very bright either. Those who trust in the press comprise only a rate of 16%. The rate of those who trust in Television channels is even lower; only 11%.

Results of another research conducted by Piar-Gallup comparing the years of 1993 and 1997 also depicts similar tendencies: Confidence in the army was 70% in 1993 and 68.8% in 1997 (Piar-Gallup, 1997:103). There is not very significant difference between the rates of the two researches, again our public trust mostly in the army. However, the confidence in the Parliament was 44.9% in 1993, whereas it decreased to 37.7% in 1997 (Piar-Gallup 1997:97). Rate of confidence in the Parliament is both very low and it also decreased more in time.

Esmer compared the situation of political parties between 1991 and 1997 as shown below:

	<i>1991</i>	<i>1997</i>
Leftist	5	7
Middle Left	20	14
Middle	50	35
Middle Right	18	23
Rightist	8	20

Another reliable research conducted in 1996 by Necat Erder depicts these results (Erder, N., 1996:46):

Leftist 15.5
 Rightist 41.2
 Others 28.2
 Not replied 15.1

As it s seen, results of the two researches support each other, hence show the real situation.

**THE RELATION BETWEEN PROCESSES, POWERS AND VOTERS:
 TURKEY IN THE 21st CENTURY**

When we compare the tendencies shown above with percentages, with our previous analyses, remembering that the processes and powers that will shape Turkey in the 21st century will interact with the voters on the social ground, we can say that everybody can form the main determining factors according to their own consent and write different scenarios for the future.

For example Sahin Alpay summarizes the results of his work called "Turkey in 2020" (Alpay, 1991:9) based upon the assumption of "expectations of people that direct the political, economical and cultural lives of the society may supply important clues for the future of that society" as follows:

"A Turkey that is much more wealthy than today, reached upper levels in the list of the richest countries in the world, however could not catch up yet with the most developed countries.
 A Turkey that attained the high standard of Western democracies with its own democratical regime. But it could not achieve to form an open society, yet.
 A Turkey that never deviated from its historical route directing towards the West and took part in the European Union "stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals", although is not a full member of EU, it plays an important political-economical role in the region." (Alpay, 1991:180-181)

This scenario written by an elitist in Turkey does not only depict what "may" happen, but also definitely determines what "will" happen.

The three processes that I defined in my work as the *globalisation* that weakens the nation-state, *urbanisation* that creates an arabesque plundering culture and *democratisation* that propagates the participation of the public in the administration of the country, will be influential within the frame of expectations of elitists and in respect to voters whose attributes I tried to identify above.

The three great powers, *the USA, big capitalists and the military bureaucracy* will continue directing the community by molding the voters and shaping the political parties.

We will witness together what kind of interaction structure will be formed by these three processes and three powers in cooperation with organised sections of the society and how effective this structure will be.

The intention of this book was not writing a scenario, but to provide data that can be used by everybody. Because I think how much ever we try to establish our future upon strong and correct data, to that degree we will be able to achieve a reformation and development that are tranquil, peaceful and free from any turmoil.

Because of this, based upon the understanding of "tomorrow's determinant is today and today's determinant is yesterday", I gathered many data and tried to analyse and comment upon them.

I will be very glad if I will be able to contribute something to the scenario writers, directors, players, critics and viewers if Turkey in the 21st century.

I would like to remind lastly that the democratisation process is a play that is formed with the contribution of everybody and that is not only "watched", but entered into and played a part in person.

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